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ABSTRACT 
The choice of capital structure is one of the most dominant decisions that define the 
financial state of a firm. Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that capital structure is 
irrelevant, but the financial conditions required for this statement are not met in the real 
world. Different capital structure theories have been presented but there is no consensus 
of which of these theories could be considered as a norm. This complicates the 
investigation of capital structure’s effects on firm operations. One big issue is how 
leverage affects the firm’s investments and growth.  
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the discussion of the effect of leverage on 
firm growth measured in capital expenditures and changes in employment. Furthermore, 
whether the firm's growth opportunities affect this relationship. This research also 
closely concentrates on the financial crisis and how that has affected the relationship 
between leverage and firm growth.  
 
The data in this research consist of listed U.S. companies from 2002-2013 with at least 
one billion dollar sales measured in 2002 dollars. Growth is measured with capital 
expenditures growth, employment growth and net investment growth. Multiple linear 
regressions with White adjusted standard errors are estimated for three time periods: 
whole period of 2002-2013, normal period of 2002-2006 and 2011-2013 combined, and 
abnormal period of 2007-2010. This is done to test if the financial crisis has affected the 
relation between leverage and firm growth. The regressions are also conducted for 
subgroups defined by Tobin’s q to examine if the firms’ growth opportunities affect the 
relation between capital structure and growth. 
 
The results show that in normal economical times, leverage is negatively associated 
with firm growth. However, this relation is stronger for firms with poor growth 
opportunities. During economical downturn, leverage has a strong negative relation 
with growth for firms with poor growth opportunities, but not for other firms. The 
results provide evidence for that leverage is negatively associated with firm growth 
particularly for firms with low growth opportunities and that economical downturn 
strengthens this relation for firms with poor growth opportunities and eliminates it for 
firms with high growth opportunities. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Capital structure, Growth, Leverage, Investment, Subprime crisis  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Every firm has to think what is the optimal debt level that maximizes the firm’s 
profitability and allows the firm to take the projects with positive net present value and 
increase the growth of the firm. Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958) argued in their 
famous paper that capital structure is irrelevant. However, their results assume that the 
capital markets are perfect, corporate taxes are absent and firm’s financing and 
investment decisions are independent. These assumptions do not hold in real world, and 
that is why MM’s results can only be considered as theoretical framework. Many more 
capital structure theories that try to identify the “perfect” capital structure of companies 
have been presented. Tradeoff theory suggests that the optimal capital structure is a 
result of a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of borrowing. It is based on the MM 
theory, but the benefits of taxes are added to the equation (see e.g. Myers, 1984). On the 
other hand, pecking order theory proposes that firms have a pecking order of the 
financing of their operations (see e.g. Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984). The theory 
suggests that firms prefer internal to external financing, and if they have to obtain 
external funds, they issue debt rather than equity. The choice of capital structure can 
also be a consequence of the agency costs between stakeholders that emerge from 
different interests (see e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Debt is also observed to be used 
as a shield against hostile takeover threats (see e.g. Harris & Raviv, 1988). Capital 
structure can also be formed of the financial distress or constraints that firms face. If a 
firm is not able to enter the capital markets due to insufficient asset base or similar 
reason, it may prevent the firm from obtaining external funding and thus result in 
missed growth opportunities (see e.g. Whited, 1992). Capital structure is a widely 
studied field, but because of the multiple different factors that can have an effect on the 
capital structure decisions, there has not been found any general theory about the 
formation of an optimal capital structure.  
 
In addition to capital structure, firm growth is also affected by many factors. The factors 
behind firm growth are also widely studied, and there are many propositions for the 
most important determinants of firm growth. Pasanen (2007) divided the strategies of 
firm growth to organic and non-organic. Organic growth is growth that arises from 
inside the firm and non-organic growth is a result of acquisitions. The factors of firm 
growth are often divided to internal and external factors (see e.g. Hansen, Wernerfelt & 
Birger, 1989). Internal factors include things such as human resource management, size 
of the company, company structure etc., when external factors include industrial factors, 
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competitors and other economical factors. All these factors affect the firm’s possible 
growth in some way, but many have argued that after all, the biggest contribution to 
firm growth comes from inside the company. Many researches of specific internal 
factors have usually concentrated on the age, size and management of the firm. As this 
research studies the effect of leverage on firm growth, it also mainly focuses on the 
internal factors that affect firm growth.  
 
Because of the unclear factors that define a firm’s capital structure and increases 
growth, it seems important to study this topic to see if leverage affects firm growth. 
Increasing firm performance and growing the firms operations are usually the main 
target in every business. Firm growth increases the value for shareholders and the firm 
itself because through growth, firms have more possibilities to generate profit. If the 
capital structure has an effect on firm growth, it then must be closely planned in order to 
maximize the firm’s profitability. However, since no optimal capital structure have, and 
probably will not be found, it is important to study how it affects the firm growth and 
consequently future profitability. Central banks have tried to support firm growth by 
offering historically low interest rates after the financial crisis that occurred in 2007 in 
order to give companies a possibility to increase their business by issuing inexpensive 
debt. If capital structure affects growth, the low-cost financing may result in unexpected 
consequences in terms of growth. Because of all the unanswered question in both 
research areas of capital structure and firm growth, it is highly justified to study how 
firm growth reacts to different capital structures. There are many empirical studies that 
give support to that leverage has a negative relationship to firm growth. However these 
studies are mainly executed before the financial crisis that started in 2007 and thus the 
results may no longer be valid in modern economy. 
 
This study tries to find implications that leverage affects firm growth. Firm growth is 
studied through three different measures; net investment growth, real growth rate of 
capital expenditures and the growth rate of the number of employees. The purpose of 
this study is to contribute to the discussion of firm leverage and its effect on firm 
growth, which is measured in employment, capital expenditures and net investment 
growth, particularly during economical downturns. Earlier studies have found that 
leverage might have a negative effect on growth for only firms with low growth 
opportunities and not so much for other firms. 
 
This research follows closely to Lang’s, Ofek’s and Stulz’s paper “Leverage, 
investment and firm growth” from 1996. The sample firms are collected from the 
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United States and all the firms must have sales for over 1 billion dollars each year. The 
firms must also have SIC codes between 2000 and 3999 that represents the 
manufacturing division. The time span that the data is collected is from 2002 to 2013. 
As mentioned, the regressions are also computed for two additional subperiods. These 
periods are divided in normal and abnormal periods, which are defined by the subprime 
crisis that occurred in 2007. Including the time periods defined by financial crisis gives 
justification to reproduce the idea of Lang et al. (1996), since this financial crisis was 
unlike any other experienced in the modern global financial world and thus may have 
had an effect on the capital structure decisions of firms. Because of the magnitude of the 
crisis and the fact that it has affected the whole financial world, valuable growth 
opportunities are likely to have been lost and thus made growth of firms more difficult. 
Also risk aversion of investors has increased and obtaining new external funding may 
have become more challenging. The motivation of this paper is to contribute to the 
earlier literature and to find if the subprime crisis has affected the impact of leverage on 
firm growth. 
 
 
1.1 Research problems and hypotheses 
 
This study tries to answer three research problems. First problem is to find if leverage 
affects the growth of firms defined by different growth variables. Earlier results suggest 
a negative effect of leverage on firm growth. Second problem is to find if firm’s growth 
opportunities affect the relationship between leverage and firm growth. Capital structure 
theories suggest that firms with good investment opportunities should have low 
leverage and thus, a negative relation between leverage and growth should be observed 
for firms with good investment opportunities. However, earlier results find (see Lang, 
Ofek and Stulz, 1996) that mainly firms with poor investment opportunities experience 
a negative relation between leverage and firm growth. Third research problem captures 
the main contribution of this study, which is to show how leverage affects firm growth 
in modern economy that experiences high and low peaks. The third research problem is 
to find if leverage has a different effect on firm growth during economical downturns. 
This research problem signifies this study and gives new contribution to existing 
literature. Three research questions are as follows: 
 
1. Does leverage affect the growth of firms defined by different growth variables? 
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2. Does the firm’s growth opportunities affect the relationship between leverage and 
firm growth? 
 
3. Does leverage have a different effect on firm growth during economical downturns? 
 
To examine if the negative effect is persistent for all firms despite different growth 
opportunities or just for firms with poor growth opportunities, and also to find if 
different economical times affect the relationship between leverage and firm growth, 
two hypotheses for three time periods are proposed. The first hypothesis in this research 
is  
 
H1: Leverage and firm growth has a negative relationship.  
 
This hypothesis is tested to generally find implications of leverage affecting firm 
growth. The second hypothesis is 
 
H2: Leverage has a different effect on firm growth depending on the firm’s growth 
opportunities. 
 
Since globalization has made financial crises affect firms all over the world despite the 
origin of the crisis, the two hypotheses are tested for two additional time periods to find 
if the effect of leverage changes during different economic periods. To answer the 
research problems, the two hypotheses are tested for different time periods. The time 
periods tested in addition to the whole period are the normal period of 2002–2006 and 
2011–2013 combined, and the financial crisis period of 2007–2010. This method 
enables to analyze the effect of leverage on firm growth in general and also the effect of 
financial crisis on that relation.   
 
Earlier results imply that in contrary to MM’s research, there is a strong negative 
relationship between leverage and firm growth and investments. According to earlier 
results especially by Lang et al. (1996), firms with low growth opportunities might 
suffer significantly more of leverage in terms of firm growth. Lang et al. (1996) find 
support for the first hypothesis, but it may be because firms with low growth 
opportunities have much more significant and negative relationship between leverage 
and growth than firms with high growth opportunities, which is practically evidence for 
supporting the second hypothesis. However, in addition to testing these hypotheses 
during 2002–2013, testing the effect of leverage on firm growth during the financial 
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crisis of 2007–2010 does not have much earlier evidence and this study tries to 
contribute to this lack of knowledge.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows. First, earlier literature and previous results on the 
topic are presented. Then the financial crisis is studied in order to point out issues that 
could affect the capital structures of firms and to illustrate how economical atmosphere 
has changed. Then the sample data is presented and analyzed. After data analysis, the 
regressions are conducted following the analysis of the results. The research is 
concluded in the final chapter.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter analysis some theories concerning firm’s capital structure and firm growth. 
First, capital structure related theories are presented, and second the theories related to 
firm growth are presented. Finally, earlier results on the effect of leverage on firm 
growth are presented and discussed. 
 
 
2.1 Capital structure theories 
 
Capital structure is an important and widely studied field in finance. After Modigliani 
and Miller presented in 1958 their result that capital structure is irrelevant, a wave of 
researches started to try to describe the construction of an optimal capital structure. In 
this chapter some of the main papers on capital structure and the theories behind it are 
reviewed. First, the famous Modigliani-Miller paper from 1958, which has given the 
basis for all the following studies, is presented. After that, some other famous theories 
such as tradeoff theory, pecking order theory and theories related to agency costs are 
reviewed. Also some other models are presented and finally, earlier results on the topic 
are presented. 
 
2.1.1 Modigliani-Miller 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) studied the cost of capital when the investments yields are 
uncertain and the funds can be obtained from many different sources such as pure debt 
instruments or pure equity issues. The cost of capital is an important aspect in 
investments because the yield of the investment must exceed interest rate to be 
profitable. The economic theorists have avoided the cost of capital problem by 
assuming that the yield of assets such as bonds, are sure and known streams. Given this 
assumption, the cost of capital of an investment is simply the interest rate of bonds, and 
when acting rationally, the firm will push their investment to the point where the 
marginal yield on physical assets is equal to the market rate of interest. This behavior 
follows two criteria of rationality in investment decisions: (1) the maximization of 
profits and (2) the maximization of market value. According to the first criterion, the 
asset is rational to acquire only if it will raise the net profit of the firm and to do so, the 
expected rate of return of the asset must exceed the market interest rate. The second 
criterion states that the asset is rational to acquire if it adds the market value of the firm 
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more than the cost of the acquisition. Again, the asset increases value only if the yield 
of the asset exceeds the market interest rate. To reduce the effect of uncertainty, some 
formulas have been created that take into account a risk discount. Risk discount is 
subtracted from the yield of the asset to allow the existence of uncertainty. The resulting 
“risk adjusted” or “certainty equivalent” yield is used to determine the investment 
decisions. However there is no satisfactory explanation for the size of the risk discount.  
 
After the economists recognized the importance of uncertainty, the equivalence of profit 
maximization and market value maximization disappeared. Under uncertainty, the 
outcomes of investment decisions are no longer unique profit outcomes, but many 
different possible outcomes that can be described as a subjective probability 
distribution. This leads to the fact that decisions that affect the expected value of the 
investment, will also affect the characteristics of the distribution of outcomes. So the 
use of debt rather than equity to fund the investment may increase the expected return of 
the stockholders but only at the cost of increased dispersion of the outcomes. Under the 
uncertainty, the investment decision can only be ranked by the “utility function” of the 
owners, which builds a confrontation between the expected yield and the other 
characteristics of the distribution. This utility approach is a step forward from the 
original certainty approach and it gives a little room to explore the different effects of 
debt and equity financing, and it also gives some meaning to the cost of different funds.  
However, it has some drawbacks mainly for normative purposes. Thus, an alternative 
approach, based on the market value maximization, can provide a useful theory of 
investment and basis for an operational definition of cost of capital. According to this 
approach, an investment is worth undertaking only if it raises the market value of the 
firm’s shares. This market value maximization approach has been an appreciated, yet 
not very developed theory and what seems to be lacking is a sufficient theory of the 
effect of capital structure on the market valuation. The main purpose of MM’s paper is 
to develop such theory and its implications for the cost-of-capital problem. 
 
MM’s results were that under certain conditions, the capital structure of the firm is 
irrelevant. In other words, there is no difference to the firm value, whether the funds to 
finance investments is obtained by debt or equity issues. However, this only means that 
it does not matter which financing instrument is used, but the owners may still favor one 
financing plan to another. These findings are the basis of the modern investment 
theories, and even though they are still used as a framework, there are many researches 
that show results where the source of financing matters. Also the MM theorem has been 
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criticized for not paying enough attention to market imperfections, risks and the 
limitations that high leverage brings.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected their theory of irrelevant capital structure by 
adding tax shield in their study. They find that debt financing can give a significant tax 
advantage but firms should not always seek to use the maximum possible amount of 
debt in their capital structures. For instance, using retained earnings rather than debt to 
finance projects can be cheaper regardless of the tax advantage. More importantly there 
are limitations given by lenders and other costs resulting from debt. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) reviewed a large sample of researches concerning the theory of 
capital structure. They find four different categories that try to determine firm’s capital 
structure. First category is the agency approach, where they state that due to the 
conflicts between agents, leverage is positively associated with firm value and 
negatively associated with the extent of growth opportunities. Second category is the 
asymmetric information, which means that it is assumed that insiders or managers have 
inside information about the future cash flows and investment opportunities. One point 
of view is also that firm’s capital structure signals the inside information to the 
outsiders. In this category they state that leverage increases with the extent of 
asymmetric information. Third category is models based on product/input market 
interactions. These models explore the relationship between capital structure and the 
firm’s product market strategy or characteristics of products/inputs. They find that 
leverage increases when the product is not unique, and that the level of leverage is 
associated with different firm characteristics. Fourth category is the theories driven by 
corporate control considerations, in which they state that the competition for the 
corporate control affects the capital structure. 
 
2.1.2 Tradeoff theory 
 
The optimal capital structure of a firm is often described by a tradeoff between the costs 
and benefits of borrowing. Tradeoff theory is based on the Modigliani-Miller theorem, 
which stated capital structure irrelevant, but because the interest payments offer a tax 
shield that can have significant value, a tax benefit of debt is added to the theory. Tax 
shield is the benefit of debt and since the objective function of a firm is linear, the 
optimal debt ratio would be 100%. This proposition is of course impossible, because 
there has to be a cost for a large proportion of debt. The obvious cost is bankruptcy cost. 
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(Murray & Vidhan, 2007; Myers, 1984). Myers (1984) suggests that a firm following 
tradeoff theory sets a target debt ratio by balancing debt tax shields and costs of 
bankruptcy and then moves towards this target gradually. This happens by substituting 
debt for equity or equity to debt until the firm’s debt ratio is at optimum and the market 
value is maximized.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that there is a large observed variation in actual debt ratios 
and the reason that firms do not seem to be in their optimal debt ratio might be the costs 
of adjustment. Large costs of adjustment can explain why there is a lag when firms try 
to adjust their debt ratios after random events that offset them (Myers, 1984). Another 
possible explanation for the variation is that managers do not know, or care, about the 
optimal debt ratio and thus they do not pursue it actively. Also the cost of financial 
distress, which includes bankruptcy costs and related costs, explains some of the 
financial behavior in the case of debt ratio. Previous literature on costs of financial 
distress has given two statements about financing behavior: (1) Risky firms, i.e. firms 
with wide variation in market value, tend to borrow less because the higher the variance 
rate, the greater the probability of default regardless of debt claims. Safe firms are able 
to borrow more before the expected costs of financial distress exceed the benefits of tax 
shield. (2) Firms with tangible assets borrow less than firms with intangible assets and 
growth opportunities. The cost of financial distress depends not only of the probability 
of trouble, but the value lost. Intangible assets and growth opportunities are more prone 
to lose value in financial distress. (Myers, 1984.) 
 
Zhang (2009) argues that firm’s do not follow the optimal capital structure in practice. 
As said before, tradeoff theory suggests that the optimal capital structure is determined 
by the benefits of tax shield and the costs of bankruptcy. According to Zhang (2009), 
the bankruptcy costs are not simple to measure. Bankruptcy costs consists of direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs include items such as legal, accounting and reorganization 
costs and these are rather simple to measure. These costs have been found to be around 
4% to 10% of the firm’s value three years prior the bankruptcy (Altman, 1984). The 
indirect costs include items such as lost sales, declining margins, loss of key personnel 
and loss of management time and effort. These costs are much harder to measure and 
Zhang (2009) argues that these costs might be substantially larger than the direct costs. 
Because of the overvaluation of tax shield and the undervaluation of the bankruptcy 
costs, the “optimal” capital structure suggest too high leverage and thus the optimal 
capital structures of firms are not met in practice. 
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2.1.3 Pecking order theory 
 
One of the basic theories of capital structure is ”Pecking order” theory (see e.g. 
Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Donaldson (1961) introduced 
a theory that firms tend to prefer internal financing rather than external financing and 
debt to equity if it issues securities. According to this description, firms accumulate 
their retained earnings and become less levered when they are profitable, and 
accumulate debt, becoming more levered, when unprofitable (Hovakimian, Opler & 
Titman, 2001). Donaldson (1961: 67) states “Management strongly favored internal 
generation as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external sources except for 
occasional unavoidable ‘bulges’ in the need for funds.” He also notices that these 
‘bulges’ were not met by cutting dividends as most of the managers saw this as 
unthinkable. However, when external financing was needed, managers were not willing 
to issue stocks. This is the pecking order that financial managers tend to follow when 
they need to raise new funds. 
 
It can be argued that internal funds are preferred to avoid issue costs and if external 
finance is needed, then debt would still be preferred to equity issues because of the still 
lower issue costs (Myers, 1984). However the “Pecking order” theory is based on 
asymmetric information between the managers and investors in the capital markets. We 
assume that asymmetric information is given and both managers and investors realize 
this. This can lead to a situation where firms pass investment opportunities with positive 
net present values (NPV). For example a firm needs to raise N dollars of funds for an 
investment opportunity with known net present value of y. The firm value without this 
investment is x. Here the managers know the values of y and x but investors do not. If a 
firm issues stocks the benefit of raising this N amount of dollars is y but there is also a 
possible cost, which is the possibility of issuing underpriced stocks. This happens when 
the firm decides to issue stocks for a market value of N, but managers know that the real 
value of the stocks after the investment opportunity is N1. This difference of N and N1 
will be the value of the shares when the investors acquire the same knowledge as the 
managers. (Myers, 1984; Myers et. al, 1984.)  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) came to a conclusion that in this situation the most rational 
objective for managers to pursue is to maximize the “true” value of the existing shares 
because they worry about the value of old shareholders’ stake in the firm. Define ΔN is 
the over- or undervaluation of the issued shares N1-N. If ΔN is negative, then the 
information that the managers posses is unfavorable and the firm will always issue, 
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even if the only benefit of the issue is a zero NPV investment. If ΔN is positive, the 
inside information of managers is favorable but the firm may pass a positive NPV 
investment opportunity rather than issuing undervalued stocks. This is a good example 
of asymmetric information working on capital markets. The cost of relying on external 
financing is not only the administrative costs, but it can lead to a situation where the 
firm chooses not to issue and thus pass up an investment opportunity with positive 
NPV. This can be avoided if the firm is capable to raise the needed funds internally.  
 
This raises a question that if a firm is not willing to issue stocks because of the 
possibility of underpricing, then should it issue debt instead? Myers (1984) state that 
there are advantages of debt over equity issues and that issuing debt is a better solution. 
The firm issues and invests only if the NPV of the investment opportunity is greater or 
equal to the amount of over- (ΔN<0) or undervaluation (ΔN>0) of the shares ΔN. If the 
ΔN is higher than the NPV of the investment and the firm issue, the value of the stake 
of old shareholders will decrease and the firm refuses to raise the money but at the same 
time the intrinsic value of the firm decreases because of the missed positive NPV 
investment opportunity. (Myers, 1984; Myers et. al, 1984.)  
 
However, if a firm is able to reduce ΔN to less than the NPV of the investment, it can 
take over the opportunity and it will not affect the old stakeholders’ value. This is 
possible by issuing the safest possible securities, i.e. a security that does not change its 
value when the inside information of managers becomes public. If the firm is able to 
issue default-risk free debt, then ΔN is zero, and the firm will take every positive NPV 
investment opportunity. The absolute value of ΔN will be less for debt than for equity 
even if default risk is added to the equation. To conclude this approach, firms should 
always issue debt rather than equity if the manager’s information is favorable (ΔN>0). 
(Myers, 1984; Myers et. al, 1984.) 
 
If the manager’s information is unfavorable, and any risky security issue is overpriced, 
then it would be logical for the firm to make ΔN as big as possible to take the maximum 
advantage of new investors. This seems reasonable and thus a rule could be defined that 
“Issue debt if the firm is undervalued, and equity, if overvalued”. Note that it is 
assumed that managers act in old stakeholders’ interest. However from the point of 
view of the investors, it seems possible to recognize the situation of the firm. If the firm 
is issuing equity only when the firm is overpriced, then in equity issues the investors 
can think that the firm’s debt capacity is full and they refuse to buy the equity since it is 
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assumed overpriced. This behavior effectively drives the firm to raise their funds as the 
pecking order theory states. (Myers, 1984; Myers et. al, 1984.) 
 
This example has assumptions that all the investors are rational and they realize the 
situation based on this model and thus it cannot be taken as a truth. It is to show how 
asymmetric information can predict the two main ideas behind the pecking order theory: 
first, the firms prefer internal financing and second, debt is preferred over equity if 
external finance is needed. (Myers, 1984.)  
 
In consistent with the pecking order theory, empirical evidence suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage, since profitable firms tend to 
accumulate their retained earnings and finance their investments with these funds. 
However, the pecking order theory seems to work only in short-run and firms tend to 
make financial decisions that in the long-run drive their leverage to the target ratio, 
which is consistent with tradeoff models of capital structure choice. For example 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) find evidence that more profitable firms have on average 
lower leverage, but these firms also tend to issue debt rather than equity and they are 
more likely to repurchase equity rather than retire debt. These actions drive the leverage 
ratio towards the target ratio and are consistent with the tradeoff models (Hovakimian 
et. al, 2001). Tradeoff models suggest that firms move their capital structure towards a 
target, which is determined by a tradeoff of the costs and benefits of borrowing (Myers, 
1984). 
 
2.1.4 Agency costs  
 
Another cost that rises when a firm’s leverage increases is agency costs. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) formed capital structure based on agency costs. They base their 
research on earlier work by Fama and Miller (1972). Agency costs emerge when a 
principal gives an agent the authority to do decisions on behalf of the principal and if 
both of the parties are utility maximizers, there is a good opportunity that the agent does 
not act in the best interest of the principal. In other words there are conflicts of interest 
amongst stakeholders. Jensen and Meckling consider agency costs as a sum of three 
factors: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures 
by the agent, and (3) the residual loss. They also identify two types of conflicts: 
conflicts between managers and equity holders, and conflicts between managers and 
debt holders. (Harris et al., 1991; Jensen et al., 1976.) 
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The agency costs are practically present in every firm unless the manager owns 100 
percent of the company. Hence we can assume that outside equity affects the amount of 
agency costs. If a manager wholly owns a firm, he will make decisions trying to 
maximize his and firm’s utility. If the owner-manager sells equity and thus receives 
outside financing, agency costs arise due to the divergence between his and the outside 
equity holders’ interests. Then the owner-manager does not capture the entire gain from 
the profit enhancement activities, but he does bear the entire cost of these activities. As 
the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional share of incomes fall and 
he might be tempted to use larger amounts of the corporate resources to perquisites 
(such as private jets etc.). Outside equity holders might then be forced to use more 
resources in monitoring the owner-manager’s behavior and thus the owner-manager’s 
wealth costs rise when his fractional ownership falls. It could also lead to a situation 
where the manager’s ownership has decreased and he might not be interested in 
searching new technologies or improving the firm’s operations if it requires too much 
effort. (Jensen et al., 1976.)  
 
If a firm could avoid the agency cost problems when the manager wholly owns the firm 
and thus eliminating the agency costs associated with outside equity, then why firms are 
not single-owned and the needed funds are not just borrowed? Firms are generally 
owned by a large number of principals and so there must be an explanation for this.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognized that with debt financing, the equity holders 
might invest suboptimally, as they may benefit from investing to risky projects that 
reduce the value of the firm. Such investments decrease the value of the debt because if 
the debt holders correctly anticipate the equity holders’ future behavior, the equity 
holders receive less for the debt than they otherwise would. The equity holders who 
issue the debt carry this cost of the incentive to invest in value-decreasing projects 
created by debt. This problem where a company changes its low-risk assets to high-risk 
investments is called the “asset substitution effect”. (Harris et al., 1991; Jensen et al. 
1976.) 
 
Adding provisions to the bond agreements that would constrain the manager’s decisions 
could eliminate the asset substitution effect. However, to completely protect the 
bondholders, these provisions would have to be extremely detailed and cover most 
operating aspects of the enterprise. The possibility of creating such provisions is almost 
impossible and most likely very expensive. It could also reduce the firm value because 
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it could limit the manager’s ability to take optimal actions on certain issues. (Harris et 
al., 1991; Jensen et al., 1976.) 
 
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) investigated the firms’ decisions whether to issue debt or 
equity when obtaining external financing. They compared their results to the three most 
accepted theories that explain the firms’ funding decisions. First the pecking order 
theory that states that asymmetric information makes equity issues more costly than 
debt issues because managers want to maximize the wealth of the old shareholders. That 
is why issuing debt is preferred to equity and if forced to issue equity, the stock price 
has a negative reaction. Second the agency model, which suggests that managers 
sometime pursue their own objectives, like firm growth, at the expense of shareholders. 
If managers concentrate on growing the firm, equity issues are more profitable than debt 
if the firm has valuable growth opportunities, but not otherwise. And finally the timing 
model, which proposes that firms issuing equity experience long-term 
underperformance afterwards. If equity is overpriced and markets underreact to the 
equity issue, the wealth of existing shareholders is maximized. The results that Jung et 
al. (1996) find support strongly the agency model. They show that a typical firm issuing 
equity has valuable investment opportunities and they experience asset growth before 
and after the issue. Also the stock prices in these situations do not show significant 
variation. Firms that do not have valuable investment opportunities but still issue equity 
against the pecking order theory, also experience high asset growth but similarly 
extremely significant negative stock price reactions. For the timing model, Jung et al. 
(1996) failed to show any significant supporting results.   
 
Other authors have also studied the agency costs rising from the conflicts between 
managers and equity holders. In contrast to the conservative behavior of managers 
introduced by Hirshleifer et al. (1992), Jensen (1986) states that managers have 
incentives to grow their firms beyond optimal size because growth increases the 
resources and power that managers possess. Firm growth is also associated with 
increases in managers’ compensations, because changes in compensations are positively 
related to the growth in sales. This supports the assumption that managers are more 
likely to invest all available funds than distributing them in cash to the investors. Also 
Harris and Raviv (1990) showed that managers always want to continue the firm’s 
current projects even if investors would prefer to liquidate the firm. In Stulz (1990), 
managers always want to invest all available funds even if distributing the cash to 
investor would be better for the investors. However, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) 
also suggest that increasing debt can prevent the “free cash flow” hypothesis where 
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managers use all available funds in poor investments. When debt levels are increased, it 
limits the financial resources available for the managers in the future. 
 
Another important subject that agency costs have an affect to is the reputation of the 
firm. It arises from the same asset substitution effect characteristics as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) described. Diamond (1989) explains in his paper about incentive 
problem between borrowers and lenders that firms use their loans to fund new projects 
and if there are no reputational effects, firms might have an incentive to invest to risky 
projects that might gain big profits but can also realize into large losses. If a firm has a 
short credit history and there is sufficient adverse selection, these incentives might be 
present. On the other hand if a firm has a good and long credit history and reputation, 
reputation can become a good incentive to prevent firms to invest in risky projects. 
When reputation has an incentive in investment decisions, it has an effect on project 
acceptance. Firms with certain reputations will turn down some profitable projects that 
other firms would be willing to accept. Especially older firms that have acquired good 
reputation are more willing to accept low-risk projects with positive net present value 
when there would be a choice to accept a higher risk project with higher net present 
value. The reputation acquired is considered as an important character and firms with 
good reputation are willing to protect it. 
 
In addition to firm reputation, managers also might have their own reputation at stake. 
The traditional agency problem as described before is that managers invest in risky 
projects that can reduce the value of the firm in hope of high returns. Hirshleifer and 
Thakor (1992) present an alternative approach to the agency problem. According to 
their paper, if the manager’s future wage is dependent on the outcome of the 
investment, the manager tries to build a good managerial reputation. This is obtained by 
seeking safe investments; investments that bondholders prefer and shareholders do not.  
This reduces the agency costs between the firm and creditors when the investment is 
funded with imperfectly covenant-protected debt. Because of the reduced agency costs, 
this also leads to higher debt-equity ratio. There is also a possible problem occurring 
when managers act too conservatively. If manager invests only in safe projects, the firm 
value might reduce and shareholders’ wealth might decrease when projects with better 
outcomes are rejected. Therefore, even though managerial conservatism reduces agency 
costs and manager’s reputation improves, it might not be optimal in all conditions.  
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2.1.5 Debt against takeover threats 
 
The capital structure affects the probability and successfulness of takeovers. The 
linkage between the market for corporate control and capital structure was introduced in 
the late 1980’s. The main principal in this linkage is that equity carries voting rights and 
debt does not (Harris et al., 1988 and Stulz, 1988). Because of the distribution of votes, 
capital structure affects the outcome of takeover contests. Harris and Raviv (1988) state 
that the capital structure indirectly determines the fraction of the equity owned by a 
firm’s manager. If the manager has a large stake, the takeover attempt by the rival is not 
easy to accomplish even if the rival manager would have a better ability to run the firm. 
On the other hand, if the manager’s stake is small, the takeover might happen even if 
the new manager would have lower ability in the control of the firm. Third possibility 
for the outcome is that the rival gathers enough equity from passive investors so that 
passive investors vote for the outcome of the takeover.  
 
In Harris et al. (1988) the manager’s stake is determined indirectly by the capital 
structure choices of the firm. Manager can increase his stake by repurchasing equity 
from passive investors and financing this repurchase by debt. When debt is issued, the 
value of the equity decreases allowing the manager to buy larger stake than without 
issuing debt. To make the takeover attempt unsuccessful, managers tend to increase the 
firm’s leverage. In the case of unsuccessful tender offers, leverage is increased, which is 
accompanied by stock price increase. Also leverage seems to be negatively correlated to 
the possibility of tender offer going through. As in Harris et al. (1988) the manager’s 
stake can be increased by issuing debt, Stulz (1988) results in a similar suggestion 
where takeover targets increase their level of debt similarly increasing the gain to 
takeover target shareholders if the takeover occurs, but also reducing the likelihood of 
this event. The gain to the shareholders increases because the takeover premium is 
positively related to debt/equity ratio, resulting in a higher stock price when leverage 
increases.  
 
It is important to notice that takeover threats resulting in changes in capital structure in 
the form of higher leverage should only be viewed as short-term changes in capital 
structure. Firms tend to increase their leverage to adapt their capital structure optimally 
only when faced with imminent and hostile takeover threats. Thus these theories have 
nothing to say about the long-run capital structure choices of firms. (Harris et al. 1990.) 
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2.1.6 Financial distress and constraints 
 
Financial distress, liquidity constraints and credit restrictions affect the investment 
opportunities and growth of firms. Numbers of studies show evidence that share issues 
typically represent around 5 percent of new external funds. If most of the new external 
funds in firms are obtained by issuing debt, credit restrictions might have a significant 
effect on corporate decisions. Asymmetric information theories state that small firms 
with low liquid assets have difficulties in entering and obtaining external finance from 
the capital markets, which is due to the low assets that cannot act as a collateral to back 
up their borrowing. This leads to these firms to behave as they have a high and variable 
discount rate. Whited (1992) finds that difficulties in obtaining external finance affects 
firm’s investment. Firms might be forced to reduce investment in order to build up its 
asset base so they can access the capital markets later. 
 
Fazzarri, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) find that firms with financial constraints may be 
exposed to large negative effects of economical downturns. This is present especially 
for small firms. They find that firms with assets less than 100 million dollars retain, on 
average, about 77 percent of their income. If an economic downturn is to happen, and 
the firm has financial constraints, their funds would experience a substantial drop 
following a drop in investments and growth. This is due to their inability to issue debt, 
and the decline in their income and consequently in their retained earnings used to fund 
investments. This magnifies the effect of financial crisis and worsens the balance sheet 
positions of these firms.  
 
Opler and Titman (1994) find interesting results when highly leveraged firms face 
industry downturns. These firms face financial constraints because of the high interest 
payments. In case of industry downturns, the highly leveraged firms seem to be quicker 
to response so that they change their operating strategies to raise efficiency. This 
usually means reducing employment and capital expenditures, which can lead to 
decrease in profitability of business. They find that firms in the top leverage decile in 
industries that experience decreases in production have a 26 percent stronger decline in 
sales than the firms in the lowest leverage decile. Consequently, these firms tend to lose 
market share and experience lower operating profits than their competitors. This 
indicates that the costs of financial distress are higher than the benefits of leverage. 
Because the subprime crisis affected the majority of financial world regardless of 
industry, it is interesting to see how it has affected the growth of firms with high 
leverage since firms have faced financial distress caused by this crisis.  
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2.2 Theories of firm growth 
 
This research is focused on studying the effect of leverage on firm growth, and thus it is 
reasonable to present theories and earlier results also on the factors affecting firm 
growth. As capital structure, firm growth also is a widely studied area and many 
researchers have tried to find factors influencing firm growth. However, researchers 
have not been able to find a consensus on the factors that determines firm growth. This 
chapter presents some of the possible explanations on the matter. 
 
2.2.1 Organic vs. non-organic growth 
 
Firm growth is generally understood as increase in size. Pasanen (2007) identifies two 
strategies for firm growth: organic and non-organic growth. These growth strategies 
differ substantially and produce challenges for managers. Organic growth has often 
been referred as growth that increases employment, whereas non-organic growth has 
been referred as growth through acquisitions, where employment does not increase, 
rather than shift from one firm to another. Pasanen (2007) finds that firms that grew 
through acquiring businesses experienced clearly larger scale of operation than firms 
that grew organically. He also notices that generally, the acquiring firms have been 
active longer than the organically growing firms. This finding might also explain the 
larger scale of operation for the acquiring firms. Also, the younger firms may not have 
enough resources to buy businesses.  
 
Another aspect that Pasanen (2007) notices is that the number of founders affected the 
strategy that firms use to grow. He finds that firms that have had only one founder have 
typically grown through acquisitions, where firms with a team of founders did not 
acquire new businesses as much and tried to grow organically. Other factors that have 
an effect to firm’s decision to grow organically or through acquisitions were the firm’s 
product structures, customer structures and the knowledge of products and services.  
 
Pasanen (2007) concludes that firm growth pattern is associated with firm 
characteristics. There were more similarities than differences between acquisition 
growth and organic growth firms, but some characteristics could be distinguished 
between the two groups. The most important factors in determining the strategy 
between acquisition growth and organic growth was the firm age and scale of 
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operations. The firm growth pattern is important for firm characteristics and thus have 
managerial implications. 
 
2.2.2 Internal and external factors affecting growth 
 
Some researchers have divided the factors affecting firm growth in two categories: 
internal and external factors. Here, some of these factors are presented, but the focus is 
kept on internal factors, because in this research the data is acquired from the United 
States and only from industrial firms to find results that are not affected by external 
factors.  
 
Hansen, Wernerfelt & Birger (1989) examined the economic and organizational factors 
affecting firm performance. In their study, they present three major external 
determinants that affect firm-lever profitability: (1) The characteristics of the industry 
that the firm is operating, (2) the firm’s position relative to its competitors and finally 
(3) the quality or quantity of firm’s resources. For the organizational variable, Hansen et 
al. (1989) use a measure of organizational climate that capture many dimensions of 
organizational factors. From these dimensions, Hansen et al. (1989) choose “Emphasis 
on Human Resources” and “Emphasis on Goal Accomplishment”. These variables 
represent the internal factors affecting firm performance. 
 
Hansen et al. (1989) find that both economical and organizational factors are important 
and independent factors in explaining firm performance. However, the organizational, 
i.e. internal, factors explain approximately twice as much of firm profit rates as the 
economical factors. Hansen et al. (1989) interpret the results so that good organizational 
practices may result to good choices of economical environment, which could even 
increase the importance of internal factors.  
 
Acar (1993) also studied the impact of key internal factors on firm performance for 
small firms. He examines five groups of internal factors and their effect on firm 
performance. These groups are (1) owner/manager experience, (2) age of firm, (3) 
production competencies, (4) marketing competencies and (5) strategy. He finds that 
competencies in terms of technology and acquisition management, and good accounting 
practices had the largest positive effect on firm size. He also finds that firms with good 
cash management and financial practices had the largest positive effect on firm’s sales 
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revenues. In contrast to earlier results, Acar (1989) cannot show relations between firm 
age and performance and also not for owner’s experience and firm performance.  
 
2.2.3 Firm size and firm growth 
 
Few of the most examined fields in the determination of firm growth are the 
relationship between firm growth and firm size and the relationship between firm 
growth and firm age. Hart and Prais (1956) started the research in the area of the effect 
of firm size on growth by examining the growth of British companies. They find that 
before the Second World War, concentration in industries increased. After the war, 
smaller firms showed very high growth rates, which resulted in decreasing 
concentration during 1939–1950. They also find that rise of new industries and new 
firms generally decrease the concentration in industries.  
 
From more recent time, Evans (1987a,b) concentrated on the determinants of firm 
growth. Evans (1987a,b) gives several contributions to the earlier literature. One of 
these contributions is his result concerning the effect of firm size on firm growth. For 
the relationship between firm growth and firm size, Evans (1987a,b) finds that firm 
growth decreases at diminishing rate with firm size. He finds that firm growth decreases 
with firm size in 89 out of 100 industries. This negative relation holds also when firm 
age is held constant. Gibrat’s Law, which states that firm growth is independent of firm 
size is thus rejected in Evans (1987a,b). This departure from Gibrat’s Law decreases as 
firm size increases, however the departure always remains. This finding that Gibrat’s 
Law does not hold is important, as many studies have assumed that the law holds. 
Especially for small firms, Gibrat’s Law fails. According to Evans (1987b), it is not 
unreasonable to assume that Gibrat’s Law holds for very large firms, but for the small 
firms, in cannot be assumed reasonably. 
 
Huynh and Petrunia (2008) studied the role of financial variables in firm growth. They 
find that firm growth increases with the firm’s assets. Huynh et al. (2008) show that 
firms that have entered the industry with high level of assets have been able to raise 
substantial amounts of new capital, indicating that it is clearly easier to enter capital 
markets with large initial asset base. Consistently with earlier results, Huynh et al. 
(2008) also find that firm growth has a negative relationship with firm size and firm 
growth displays negative growth persistence. 
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2.2.4 Firm age and firm growth 
 
The other widely studied determinant of firm growth is firm age. Jovanovic (1982) 
suggests a theory of firm growth in which efficient firms grow and survive, while 
inefficient firms decline and fail. According to Jovanovic (1982), firms find their true 
efficiency through time with a Bayesian learning process. This learning process starts 
with firms entering an industry with incomplete knowledge of their own productivity, 
but they gain more information through production. A general version of his model 
predicts that firm growth is negatively related to firm age when firm size is held 
constant. 
 
Evans (1987a,b) finds consistent results with Jovanovic about the effect of firm age on 
firm growth. He finds that firm age is an important determinant of firm growth and that 
the relationship between firm growth and firm age is negative. The results show that 
firm growth decreases with firm age when firm size is held constant for young firms. 
This finding holds for 87 of 100 industries between 1976 and 1980. He also finds that 
the same negative relation is present for a sample that pools older firms together and 
uses an estimate of age based on the average for the age category as a regressor. This 
results in a conclusion that the negative relation between firm growth and firm age is 
robust for alternative specifications, to alternative samples and to alternative time 
periods. 
 
Also consistent results of negative relationship between firm age and firm growth is 
found by Huynh et al. (2008). They find a U-shaped relationship between firm growth 
and firm age, where young firms grow rapidly, but the minimum of firm age-growth 
relationship is found at around seven years of firm age. This means that the age effect of 
high growth for young firms levels at around age seven.  
 
2.2.5 The effect of human factor on firm growth 
 
It is argued that especially for small businesses, the human factor has an overwhelming 
effect on firm’s performance. Human factor seems to have high importance on the 
firm’s operations especially for small firms because in these firms, the manager or 
owner-manager has a very high impact on the operations. Morrison, Breen and Ali 
(2003) studied the effect of owner-managers’ intention, the abilities of the business and 
the opportunity environment on firm growth. They find that a balanced alignment 
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created with all of these factors, drive the firm to growth. With some of these factors 
being weak or missing, firm growth is unlikely to be achieved. If a firm lacks 
opportunities, the owner-managers are not able to form good intentions. If the firm lacks 
business ability, the owner-managers’ intention and the business opportunities are 
unlikely to be realized. Thus, all of these factors are needed in order the firm to grow.  
 
Another human factor related operation in firms is human resource management. Datta, 
Guthrie and Wright (2005) studied the impact of human resource management on firm 
performance across industries. They find that firm competitiveness can be influenced 
with high-performance work systems. These high-performance work systems are human 
resource practices that aim to enhance and develop the abilities of employees. This 
finding is consistent with many earlier results regarding the effect of good human 
resource management. Datta et al. (2005) also find that especially in industries with low 
capital intensity, each one-standard-deviation increase in the high-performance work 
systems scale is associated with 14,3 percent higher sales per employee. For high capital 
intensity industries, the increase per employee was only approximately 1 percent. The 
high-performance work systems also affected significantly sales per employee (+20,1%) 
for growing industries. In low growth industries, each standard deviation increase in the 
work systems produced a slight decrease in sales per employee.  
 
Batt (2002) also examined the effect of human resource management on firms’ sales 
growth and employee quit rates. She finds similar results as Datta et al. (2005) that 
greater use of high-involvement human resource practices results in higher sales growth 
and lower quit rates. It is clear that management and so-called “human factor” has an 
effect on firm performance because good management can motivate the employees, set 
reasonable targets and take advantage of growth opportunities. Without good 
management, it is considerably harder to increase firm performance.  
 
2.2.6 Capital structure and firm growth 
 
Earlier literature on this topic suggests that leverage and firm growth have a negative 
relationship. Theories of capital structure state that firms with valuable growth 
opportunities should choose low leverage. Based on this theory, it seems highly 
important to investigate the effects of leverage since high leverage may prevent firms to 
grow. Previous literature studying growth opportunities has concentrated on other 
proxies for liquidity than leverage, even though increased leverage reduces the available 
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funds for investment, and makes it more difficult to raise new funding (Lang et al., 
1996).  
 
Myers (1977) studied the corporate borrowing decision and according to the theory of 
corporate borrowing decision, the amount of debt issued by a firm should be the amount 
that maximizes the market firm value. According to the theory, this debt amount is 
inversely related to the part of firm value that is contingent on discretionary future 
expenditure of the firm, where discretionary future expenditure includes all future 
investments and variable costs. For this theory to be correct, Myers suggests two 
propositions that should hold. First, debt should be used more to finance assets-in-place, 
rather than growth opportunities. This is because investment in assets-in-place is not 
discretionary. Second, for assets-in-place, heavy debt financing should be associated 
with capital-intensity and high operating leverage, and also with profitability. To 
conclude, Myers (1977) suggests that firms with high growth opportunities will use less 
debt.  
 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) also find results that support the ones in Myers (1977). In 
Kim et al. (1986), negative correlation between growth in earnings before interests and 
taxes (EBIT), and debt ratio is observed. The result is significant and relatively high as 
when EBIT growth increases with 1 percent, the debt ratio decreases by approximately 
one-third of a percent. However, Kim et al. (1986) argue that the relationship between 
EBIT growth and debt ratio may be a consequence of availability of internal funds. 
Firms that have a history with high growth, may not need as much external funds, and 
consequently result to lower debt ratios.  
 
Harris and Raviv (1990) find implications that leverage is positively associated with 
firm value, default probability, extent of regulation, free cash flow, liquidation value, 
extent to which the firm is a takeover target and the importance of managerial 
reputation. Huynh et al. (2008) also find similar implications of positive relationship 
between leverage and firm growth. The sensitivity of growth to leverage is highest for 
firms in the lowest to intermediate leverage quintiles.  
 
Capital structure and firm growth seem to possess a relationship, but it seems unclear of 
which way the relationship goes. The majority of results concerning this relationship 
seem to suggest a negative relation, but also positive relations between leverage and 
firm growth are proposed. However, the results also differ depending on what 
determinant is used to measure growth. Firm growth can be measured in many ways and 
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leverage can have a different effect on different growth measures. In this research, 
growth is measured by capital expenditures, net investment and employment growth. 
All in all, leverage clearly has an effect on the future firm growth and it feels important 
to find the true association between leverage and firm growth.  
 
 
2.3 Earlier results 
 
There are many studies concentrating on the effect of leverage on firm growth in terms 
of employment and investments, but not much using a time span that include the 
financial crisis between 2007–2010. Generally, leverage is expected to be negatively 
associated with firm growth. Stulz (1990) finds that debt payments generated from high 
leverage force managers to pay out cash flow and hence reduce investment and result in 
underinvestment. Dang (2011) finds evidence from UK supporting the problem of 
underinvestment due leverage. He finds that firms that have high growth opportunities 
reduce leverage in order to control the underinvestment problem, which occurs when 
firms are forced to spend their cash in interest payments resulting in less funds available 
for investments. Also, little evidence is found that by actively lowering firm leverage to 
reduce underinvestment incentives, firms will be more able to make value-increasing 
investments. When the effect of leverage on investments is examined, Dang (2011) 
finds that leverage has a strong, direct negative effect on the level of investment.  
 
Cantor (1990) finds that each dollar more in cash flow generates approximately 45 cents 
more investment for highly levered firms than for low-levered firms indicating that 
investment is more sensitive to cash flows for firms with high leverage. Highly levered 
firms have higher than average volatility in their expenditures. This sensitivity to cash 
flow fluctuations can be determined by the burden that debt obligations produce. High 
leverage limits the firm’s ability to borrow more funds and hence they are forced to try 
to maintain a positive cash flow cushion. To maintain the positive cash flow, these firms 
are more likely to reduce or postpone investments quickly if sales drop.  
 
Sharpe (1994) studied the relationship between a firm’s financial leverage and the 
cyclicality of its employment. The paper suggests that leverage and firm size have an 
effect on changes in labor force when sales decrease. He finds that, in particular highly 
levered and small firms are quicker to optimize their labor force during a recession but 
they do not hire new labor as quickly when the economy is rising. Cantor (1990) shows 
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evidence that leverage at the firm level is associated with employment growth rates. 
Firms with higher leverage have higher volatility in their employment rate and vary 
their employment more in response to cash flow and sales changes. This relationship is 
not a result of special industry factors, differences in firm growth rates or firm sizes. 
Because highly levered firms might have difficulties to obtain more debt, they might be 
forced to lay off labor force when sales drop in order to maintain profitability. 
 
Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) find that in Canadian firms leverage has a significant 
negative impact on investments and even stronger significant impact on investments in 
firms with low growth opportunities, i.e. low Tobin’s q. This result is consistent with 
the results of Lang et al. (1996), who show that leverage has a strong and significant 
impact on different growth variables with firms that have low Tobin’s q.  
 
As the research follows the paper by Lang et al. (1996), similar results can also be 
expected. Table 1 shows a summary of the results by Lang et al. (1996). 
 
 
Table 1. Summary results by Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) 
The table summarizes the results of the paper by Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996). The table shows the 
coefficients between leverage and growth measures. The time span in this study is 1970–1989. 
 
Book leverage 
Investment/ 
FA(0) 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
1-year 
capital 
expenditures 
growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditures 
growth 
  
    
  
Whole sample 
    
  
Unadjusted -0,105*** -0,066*** -0,200*** -0,480*** -0,634*** 
Industry-adjusted -0,089*** -0,057** -0,155*** -0,428*** -0,416*** 
  
     Tobin’s q < 1 
     Unadjusted -0,125*** -0,091*** -0,249*** -0,531*** -0,747*** 
Industry-adjusted -0,118*** -0,098*** -0,238*** -0,516*** -0,585*** 
  
     Tobin’s q > 1 
     Unadjusted -0,035 0,025 0,011 -0,305*** -0,140 
Industry-adjusted -0,016 0,047 0,064 -0,205* 0,035 
      * significant at the 10% level 
     ** significant at the 5% level 
     *** significant at the 1% level 
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Lang et al. (1996) first find a strong negative relationship between leverage and future 
growth despite differences in firm size, how leverage is measured, and which variables 
are used to forecast growths. They find a strong negative relationship between book 
leverage and growth for the whole sample. The results show that a firm that has half the 
average book leverage can have almost 50 percent higher capital expenditures growth. 
After controlling for industry effects, they still find the same result with a strong 
negative relationship between leverage and growth. 
 
However, financial theory suggests that leverage should not have such a significant 
effect on growth if the firm has valuable investment opportunities. Firm’s growth 
opportunities are measured with Tobin’s q. A high q (>1) indicates that the firm has 
many valuable investment opportunities and vice versa. After letting investment 
opportunities affect the impact of leverage on growth, Lang et al. (1996) find that all the 
dependent variables, that were net investment growth, rate of employment growth and 
rate of change in investment, are significantly negatively related to leverage for firms 
with low Tobin’s q (<1). However, for firms with high Tobin’s q, Lang et al. (1996) 
could not show highly significant negative relationship between leverage and growth 
except for only one variable, the 1-year capital expenditures growth. The relation 
between leverage and the 1-year capital expenditures growth is negative but the 
coefficient was only three-fifths of what it is for low-q firms. In addition, half of these 
coefficients for high-q firms are positive, even though not significant. These results 
diminish the significance of the first results where Lang et al. (1996) find negative 
significant relations between leverage and growth for all firms. This indicates that the 
difficulties to obtain external funding are not so serious for high-q firms whose valuable 
investment opportunities are recognized in the capital markets. In contrary, it seems that 
if leverage reduces growth, it is because firms with high leverage have difficulties to 
obtain external funding because their investment opportunities are not recognized and 
investors are reluctant to offer funding. Consequently, this leads to higher opportunity 
costs for these low-q firms. The result that negative relation between growth and 
leverage exists for only low-q firms holds within and across industries, for different 
measures of leverage based on book values, for different measures of investment 
opportunities, for different estimation methods, for subsamples of better performing 
firms, for subperiods and for small firms. (Lang et al., 1996.) 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the data and methodology used in this study. First, the time period 
of 2002–2013 is examined in the point of view of financial markets to illustrate the 
economical state of this time. Next, the data is introduced and described and finally the 
methodology used in this study is presented. 
 
 
3.1 Financial markets during the observed period 
 
This research is conducted with data from time span of 2002–2013. The research data in 
Lang et al. (1996) is from 1970 to 1989, and thus it seems justified to reproduce their 
research idea with new data to see whether there has been a change in the relationship 
between growth and leverage. Also the new regulations and new instruments in the 
financial markets may have had an effect on the capital structure policy in firms. Firms 
may also be more careful after the global financial crisis that occurred between 2007 
and 2010. These are the motives that this research is made with data from time period of 
2002–2013. 
 
In addition to examine the whole period of 2002–2013, additional subperiods are 
included to find implications of the effects of financial crisis on the relation between 
leverage and firm growth. The subperiods are divided in normal and abnormal years. 
The normal years are 2002–2006 and 2011–2013 combined and the abnormal years are 
2007–2010.  
 
These normal and abnormal periods can be identified from figure 1 that shows the daily 
S&P 500 index closing values. In 2002, the economy was reviving from the dot-com 
crisis that collapsed the markets at the turn of the century and after this, the stock 
markets rose until the subprime crisis. Figure 1 shows how S&P 500 started to decrease 
during 2007 and finally collapsed in the end of 2008 mostly because of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers that triggered the global financial crisis. In the beginning of 2011 the 
S&P 500 index has climbed almost back to the level before the crisis. 
 
In the end of 2014 the S&P 500 has climbed over 2000 points and according to many 
investors, U.S. stock markets are in a bubble. Also other indicators support this view. 
Figure 2 shows the Dow Jones stock market daily closing values from 1985 to 2014. 
Two confirmed bubbles, dot-com and housing, can be identified from it. During the dot- 
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com bubble in 1997 to 2001, the Dow Jones stock market peaked at around 12000 
points. During the housing bubble between 2007 and 2010 the Dow Jones peaked at 
around 14000 points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. S&P 500 index closing values: 2002–2013. Source: Yahoo! Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Daily Dow Jones Industrial average closing values: 1985 –2014. Source: Stooq.com 
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At the moment the Dow Jones industrial average is above 16000 points, which indicates 
that the next bubble might already exist and the burst is not long away. Some analysts 
think that this might be a consequence of the Federal Reserve’s loose interest rate policy 
as they are trying to add liquidity to the markets. In July 2013 Bryan Kelly from CNBC 
reported that the “total-market-cap to GDP” ratio is at its all time high of 118%. Some 
investors use this ratio in order to measure the state of financial markets. According to 
the report, the ratio has exceeded 100% only twice before: in 1999 and in 2007. (CNBC, 
2013.) 
 
Federal funds rate is an important interest rate that is used as a benchmark in financial 
markets. Figure 3 shows the daily federal funds rate for the period 2002–2013. The 
figure shows how the interest rates were historically low from 2002 to 2004. This 
boosted the economy and it was followed by a rising interest rate policy from the 
Federal Reserve before the collapse. After the collapse, the Federal Reserve has kept the 
interest rates low in order to revive the economy by offering low cost debt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Daily Federal Funds rate: 2002–2013. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
 
 
From figure 3 it can be seen that after 2007 the daily federal funds rate has been 
decreasing and finally been near zero after 2009. This is due to the interest rate policy 
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practiced by the Federal Reserve as they are trying to restore the economy by offering 
cheap money. This is supposed to give companies a chance to get hold of relatively 
inexpensive funds and if companies exploit this opportunity, it has a clear affect to firm 
leverage. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 give justification for the different subperiods in this research. The US 
economy had a financial crisis called dot-com crisis between 1997 and 2001. The 
economy started to grow in 2002 and remained “normal” until the subprime crisis that 
started to affect the economy in 2007. From figure 1 it can be seen that the latter normal 
period started around 2011 and has continued since even though the interest rate policy 
is still trying to make recovery moves to help the economy. It could be argued that the 
latter normal period has already ended and the economy is now in a new abnormal 
period, but since this cannot yet be confirmed, it is assumed that the normal economy 
period is still under way. 
 
3.1.1 Subprime crisis 
 
As can be seen from the figures 1 and 2, both S&P 500 index and Dow Jones industrial 
average collapsed during 2007. This was the result of the subprime mortgage crisis that 
occurred in the United States. Before the crisis the macroeconomic conditions were that 
growth was strong and inflation was low. This resulted in strong capital ratios, 
innovations, low default rates, high business volumes and profitability. Financial 
markets also enjoyed historically low interest rates for a few years before the crisis. 
These factors may have affected the actors in financial markets by making them 
overconfident and reducing their risk aversion.  
 
The factors that were essential in the rising of the subprime crisis were the increase in 
US real estate prices, the easy obtainability of loans and financial innovations. The most 
important innovation was the subprime mortgage and the instruments derived from 
these loans. The subprime mortgages meant that people with bad credit histories were 
able to buy real estate with borrowed money. The interest rates were low (around 1%) 
and this led to a lending boom that was the beginning of the crisis. These subprime 
mortgages were transformed into instruments that had high risk and high margins and 
they were tradable in the markets. When the Federal Reserve started to raise the interest 
rates from 1% to 5,25% in 2004 (see fig. 2), the lending decreased and the rise in 
housing prices stopped. In 2006 the default rates started to rise but not until 2007 these 
  
39 
defaults really affected the economy in the US. The instruments derived from the 
subprime mortgage loans quickly lost value through the defaults and the crash in real 
estate prices made the underlying assets almost worthless. The crisis spread quickly and 
affected the whole economy and also transmitted to other countries. (Ackermann, 
2008.) 
 
The financial crisis described was so severe that it affected many areas of finance. 
Banks are now more concerned about the asymmetric information and default risks that 
companies have and liquidity has gained more importance. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision made new regulations for banks in form of Basel III and these 
regulations have high concentration towards capital requirements, liquidity and different 
types of risks. Also leverage ratios of banks are regulated more specifically and a 
minimum leverage ratio of 6% was introduced in July 2013. All these regulations mean 
that banks have to decrease their lending to meet the requirements. (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2014.) 
 
Because the financial crisis occurred rapidly and the changes in economy were so 
unanticipated, it is interesting to see how leverage affected the growth of companies 
during and after the crisis. Many growth opportunities disappeared when markets 
collapsed and if firms were using debt to finance their investments, they might have 
been left with large debts and interest payments without any particular target to use it to. 
On the other hand, after the crisis firms have been able to obtain inexpensive external 
funding because of the low interest rates. If the firms have been able to use these funds 
efficiently, they might have been able to grow and this could show as a positive relation 
between leverage and firm growth. The US economy has started to stabilize so it is 
possible to see and analyze the effects of the crisis on leverage and firm growth. This is 
why the crisis subperiod is included in this research. 
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
To make this research as significant as possible, the data consist of only large firms. 
There are several benefits to using large firms. First, if a negative relationship between 
leverage and growth exists, we could expect it to be weaker for larger firms that have 
been running for longer time period and thus already used public securities markets. If 
such relationship exists, it is more convincing to show it with a sample of large rather 
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than small firms. Second, a relation between leverage and growth has stronger 
implications for aggregate economic growth if it can be shown with large firms. Third, 
the data used in this research is easier to obtain from larger firms and this reduces the 
possibility of data omissions.  
 
Because the research data is composed of large firms, restrictions to assure that the 
firms fit the definition of “large” have to be made. Thus, the base sample is also 
restricted so that the firms must have data on sales and at least one billion in sales each 
year of the time period. The data is collected from firms operating in the United States, 
so that no regional regulations can affect the data. To avoid industry-specific 
regulations, the firms must have SIC codes in the range of 2000–3999, which means 
that the sample consists of only industrial firms.  
 
To calculate the growth measures, the firms must have data on capital expenditures, 
fixed assets, depreciation and number of employees for each year. To measure leverage, 
firms must have data on book values of short- and long-term debt and on book value of 
total assets. Tobin’s q is used to measure the firms’ growth opportunities and for this 
variable, firms must also have data on market value of equity.  
 
The data is obtained from ThomsonReuters. To ensure that the data is valid and to 
minimize biases in the data, the companies in the base sample are restricted so that they 
have to be listed in New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq. Firms that are unlisted, 
delisted or traded in OTC bulletin board are not included in the sample.  
 
 
3.3 Definition of variables 
 
In this section all the variables used in this research are explained. First are the 
dependent variables that measure firm growth in three different ways. Next, the 
independent variable firm leverage and the control variables that affect firm growth are 
defined. Finally business cycle indicator variable is introduced.  
 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
 
To measure firm growth, three dependent growth measure variables are included in the 
regressions. First is the growth rate of real capital expenditures. It is used to measure the 
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rate of change of investment. It is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year +1 
(+3) adjusted for inflation (using the consumer price index CPI) to the capital 
expenditures in year 0, minus one.  
 
(1)   
                         
         
  
 
Second growth variable is the ratio of the number of employees in year +1 (+3) to the 
number of employees in year 0, minus one. This measures the growth rate of 
employment. The employment growth measure is justified as Cantor (1990) shows that 
firm level leverage has an effect on employment when there is change in sales and cash 
flow and also Sharpe (1994) shows that the effect of sales growth on employment 
depends on leverage.  
 
(2)   
                       
        
 
 
The final measure is the net investment growth. It is defined as net investment in year 
+1 divided by the book value of fixed assets in year 0. Net investment is measured as 
capital expenditures in year +1 minus depreciation in year +1. Measuring investments 
net of depreciation provides a more accurate picture of the actual value of the 
investment. 
 
(3)    
        
      
 = 
                            
      
 
 
In all of the equations Inv is investment, FA is fixed assets, CapEx is capital 
expenditures and Empl is the number of employees. These are applied for the years 
indicated in the parenthesis. Year 0 refers to the base year. 
 
The growth rate of real capital expenditures and the ratio of the number of employees 
are calculated for both year +1 to year 0 and year +3 to year 0. The net investment 
growth is computed for only year +1. 
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3.3.2 Independent variables  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of book leverage on firm growth. 
Book leverage acts as the explanatory variable and it is measured as the ratio of the 
book value of short-term and long-term debt to the book value of total assets. Following 
Lang et al. (1996), the book leverage is used instead of market leverage because market 
leverage could reflect recent changes in the market value of equity or the market 
expectations of growth. Lang et al. (1996) tested alternative measures of leverage and 
all except market leverage gave similar relations with firm growth. 
 
3.3.3 Control variables 
 
In addition to book leverage, other variables that are known to affect the growth 
measures are controlled. First control variable is cash flow before interest expense in 
year 1 divided by total assets in year 0. Cash flow is measured before interest expense 
because cash flow net of interest expense captures the effect of leverage only partially, 
because firms with higher interest expense have higher leverage. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) find that a firm’s opportunity cost of internal finance can be 
substantially lower than the opportunity cost of external finance. This can be reasoned 
so that investment is related to the availability of internal funds. For this reason, cash 
flow measured before interest expense is more accurate because this way high leverage 
and resulting high interest expense cannot affect as much to the cash flow. Also cash 
flow net of interest expense may proxy the firm’s capital structure rather than the 
availability of internal funds. Cash flow before interest expense then also partly 
eliminates the effects of a firm’s capital structure. 
 
(4)   
                                     
      
 
 
Second control variable is percentage sales growth from year -1 to 0 to allow for a 
multiplier effect. 
 
(5)   
         
          
 
 
The third control variable is capital expenditures in year 0, divided by fixed assets in 
year 0. 
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(6)   
         
      
 
 
The final control variable is Tobin’s q, which is also used to define if the firm has high 
or low growth opportunities. Tobin’s q is computed for all firms and for all yearly 
observations. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and 
market value of equity to the replacement value of the firm’s assets. Replacement value 
of the firm’s assets is calculated as total assets or as book value of equity plus book 
value of debt. Tobin’s q is based on the finding that the relation between market value 
and replacement cost has a strong impact on investment decisions. Q represents the ratio 
of market value to replacement costs and if, at the margin, q exceeds 1, firms have an 
incentive to invest since the value of their new investment in capital would exceed its 
costs (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). This can be simplified so that firms with higher q’s 
have more valuable growth opportunities. In this study, if Tobin’s q exceeds one, the 
firm is believed to have high growth opportunities and if the figure is below one, the 
firm is treated as it has low growth opportunities.  
 
 
(7)   
                     
  
 
 
, where TA is total assets, MV is market value and BV is book value. There is one 
exception in the use of Tobin’s q as control variable in this study. Because of 
multicollinearity, Tobin’s q is not used in one of the regressions because it shows a 
relatively high and significant correlation with cash flow before interest expenses 
divided by total assets. In this case, Tobin’s q also showed very high variance inflation 
factor (VIF), which indicates multicollinearity.  
 
3.3.4 Dummy variable 
 
Because of business cycle, growth can be high for firms for certain years and if 
simultaneously firm leverage is low, a negative relationship between firm leverage and 
growth measures could be found because leverage proxies for business cycle. To avoid 
this, indicator variables are added to the regressions for each year. These indicator 
variable coefficients are not presented in the results tables.  
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To illustrate the variables in a more reader-friendly manner, table 2 summarizes and 
shortly defines the variables used in this study. 
 
Table 2. Summary of variables  
The table summarizes the variables used in this study and also shortly defines them. 
 
Type Variable Definition 
   
   Dependent 1-year capital 
expenditures growth 
Measures the growth of capital expenditures in 1 year, capital 
expenditures in year 1 divided by capital expenditures in year 0 
 
 
 
 
3-year capital 
expenditures growth 
Measures the growth of capital expenditures in 3 years, capital 
expenditures in year 3 divided by capital expenditures in year 0 
 
 
 
 
1-year employment 
growth 
Measures the growth of employees in 1 year, number of employees in 
year 1 divided by no. of employees  in year 0 
 
 
 
 
3-year employment 
growth 
Measures the growth of employees in 3 years, number of employees 
in year 3 divided by no. of employees  in year 0 
 
 
 
 
Net investment growth Measure the net growth of investments, capital expenditures in year 1 
minus deprecation divided by fixed assets in year 0 
     
 
 
 Independent Book leverage Measures the ratio of debt to total assets, book value of total debt 
divided by book value of total assets 
      
 
 
 Control Cash flow (1) / TA (0) Cash flow gross of interest expenses in year 1 divided by total assets 
in year 0 
 
 
 
 
Capital expenditures (0) / 
FA (0) Capital expenditures in year 0 divided by fixed assets in year 0 
 
 
 
 
Sales growth Sales in year 0 divided by sales in year -1 
 
 
 Tobin's Q Book value of debt and market value of equity divided by book value 
of total assets 
      
 
 
 Dummy Business cycle A dummy variable for each year is included 
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3.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
The data in this research consist of 386 listed companies from the North America from 
years 2002 to 2013. The final sample consists of 4632 firm-year observations.  Table 3 
presents the general characteristics of the data set.  
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
The sample period is 2002–2013. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars for each year. All 
data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) growth is the 
percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net investment 
growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets 
(FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets (TA). Sales 
growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of equity and book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest expenses. All 
values are adjusted for inflation. 
 
Variable Average 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
# of 
obs. 
1-year CapEx growth 0,453 -0,192 0,074 0,407 5,648 4246 
3-year CapEx growth 1,183 -0,206 0,238 0,862 15,654 3474 
1-year employment growth 0,068 -0,034 0,023 0,092 0,940 4246 
3-year employment growth 0,238 -0,061 0,080 0,274 1,946 3474 
Net investment growth 0,065 -0,044 0,011 0,075 1,015 4246 
Book leverage 0,216 0,041 0,177 0,291 0,528 4632 
Cash flow (1) / TA (0) 0,034 0,052 0,101 0,146 1,380 4246 
CapEx (0) / FA (0) 0,213 0,116 0,173 0,257 0,166 4629 
Sales growth 1,152 0,991 1,079 1,174 1,640 4227 
Tobin's q 2,326 0,939 1,355 2,071 13,940 4632 
 
 
As in Lang et al. (1996) the data set shows positive median values for every growth 
measure. The 3-year capital expenditures growth seems relatively high compared to 
Lang et al. (1996), with over three times higher median value. Moreover, in contrast to 
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their study, the Tobin’s q values are significantly higher in this data set as the median 
Tobin’s q is almost twice as high. Here, even the 25th percentile is near one, which is 
considered as the threshold value that defines if a firm has high or low growth 
opportunities. In this data set it seems that most of the companies are highly valued in 
the equity markets, since high market value raises the Tobin’s q. The average leverage 
is slightly lower than in Lang et al. (1996). 
 
The average capital expenditures growth for years 1 and 3 differ clearly from the ones 
in Lang et al. (1996). These are relatively high as average 1-year capital expenditures 
growth is 45,3% and for 3-years it is 118,3%. To compare, Lang et al. (1996) have 
average values of 11,1% and 23,7%, respectively. However, the median values for these 
variables are 7,4% and 20,6%, that are clearly closer to the average values in Lang et al. 
(1996). However, regardless of the median values, firms seem to have used significantly 
more funds in capital expenditures during the time period in this study. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The annual mean and median of book leverage and Tobin’s q 
 
 
As a considerable part of this research aims to find if leverage has a different effect on 
growth for firms with different level of growth opportunities, it is reasonable to 
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shows the development of mean and median book leverages and Tobin’s q’s for the 
whole sample in the time period of 2002–2013. The figure shows clearly how the 
subprime crisis affected firms’ growth opportunities and thus their market values, as the 
Tobin’s q, especially average Tobin’s q drops substantially in 2006–2007. This 
indicates that when the crisis occurred, the investment possibilities for firms decreased. 
There seems to also be a slight reaction in book leverages to the financial crisis. Figure 
4 shows that the average book leverages decreased during the crisis. The leverage ratios 
started to rise in 2006 and reached its peak around 2007 and 2008. The leverage ratios 
then decreased until 2010, after they started to rise again. This might be because of 
extremely low interest rates that Federal Reserve has provided since 2009 (see fig. 3), 
but there might also be other possible implications of the crisis on corporate financing 
decisions. 
 
3.4.1 Correlations between variables 
 
The correlations between all the variables are shown in table 4. The first line shows the 
unadjusted correlations and the second line shows the industry-adjusted correlations. 
The dependent variables are 1- and 3-year capital expenditures (CapEx) growth, 1- and 
3-year employment growth and net investment growth. Leverage is the independent 
variable and the rest are control variables. This setting follows the Lang et al. (1996) 
paper. Leverage seems to correlate slightly negatively with all the dependent variables 
in unadjusted observations, although none of the correlations is significant. In the 
industry-adjusted correlations there are two significant results in 3-year CapEx and 
employment growth, but unlike in Lang et al. (1996), these correlations are positive. 
However all the correlations between leverage and growth measures are relatively low. 
 
Another noteworthy observation is the high and significant negative correlation between 
Tobin’s q and cash flow. The correlation is near minus one and it is significant at 1 
percent level for both raw and industry-adjusted data. This correlation can lead to 
multicollinearity problems when they are both used as control variables and therefore 
multicollinearity tests are applied to test if the correlation between Tobin’s q and cash 
flow has a significant effect on results. To test the multicollinearity, variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) of the variables are examined and if the values are above five, the 
variable with the highest VIF is dropped from the regression. Some literature suggests 
that VIFs higher than 5 show multicollinearity and some literature even suggest 10 as 
the cutoff value. VIF is calculated as             
   and hence, VIFi = 5 implies  
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Table 4. Correlations between variables 
The first line gives correlation between variables for the raw data. The second line gives the correlation 
between variables using industry-adjusted data. Industry-adjusted variables are obtained by subtracting 
the industry median at the four-, three-, and two-digit SIC levels. Capital expenditures (CapEx) growth is 
the percent change in capital expenditures. Employment growth is the percent change in employment. Net 
investment growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of 
fixed assets (FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets 
(TA). Sales growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of 
equity and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest 
expenses. All values are adjusted for inflation.  
 
 
1-year 
CapEx 
growth 
3-year 
CapEx 
growth 
1-year 
employm
ent 
growth 
3-year 
employm
ent 
growth 
Net 
investme
nt 
growth 
Book 
leverage 
Cash 
flow /TA 
Capital 
expend
itures 
(0) / FA 
Sales 
growth 
3-year CapEx 0,752** 1 
       growth 
 0,190** 1 
       
1-year employment  0,796** 0,847** 1 
      growth 
0,072** 0,126** 1 
      
3-year employment  0,630** 0,871** 0,767** 1 
     growth 
0,029 0,232** 0,582** 1 
     
Net investment  0,224** 0,019 0,022 0,02 1 
    growth 
0,251** 0,221** 0,122** 0,180** 1 
    
Book leverage -0,009 -0,007 -0,018 -0,014 -0,009 1 
   
 
0,000 0,055** -0,021 0,057** 0,007 1 
   
Cash flow / TA  -0,033* -0,01 -0,011 -0,089** -0,034* -0,155** 1 
  
 
-0,059** -0,031 -0,029 -0,309** -0,094** -0,166** 1 
  
CapEx (0) / FA -0,041** -0,042* 0,008 0,012 0,127** -0,071** -0,063** 1 
 
 
-0,072** -0,086** 0,055** 0,104** 0,149** -0,041** -0,073** 1 
 
Sales growth 0,110** 0,012 0,066** 0,098** 0,002 0,003 0,013 0,034* 1 
 
0,126** 0,011 0,063** 0,094** 0,042* 0,009 0,014 0,022 1 
Tobin's Q 0,046** 0,011 0,028 0,096** 0,058** 0,169** -0,904** 0,047** 0,000 
  0,089** 0,055** 0,095** 0,343** 0,160** 0,178** -0,905** 0,035* -0,007 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
       * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
       
 
that   
     , or 80% of the variability in the ith variable is explained by the remainder 
of the variables in the model (Craney & Surles, 2002). The level of VIF that determines 
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existing multicollinearity is a “rule-of-thumb” rather than an exact fact. Also values as 
low as 2 and 2,5 have been used as the cutoff value. Cutoff value of five is chosen here 
because it is considered as rather safe value to ignore multicollinearity and after testing 
the VIFs for all the different data settings used in this study, the highest VIFs occurred 
only for control variables (Tobin’s q and cash flow before interest), which is known to 
have only minor effect on the results as the variables of interest do not have 
multicollinearity. 
 
For cases where VIF exceeds five, the control variable with the highest VIF is dropped 
from the regression to ensure that multicollinearity does not bias the results. The VIF 
exceeds five only once out of eighteen instances in this study, so we can somewhat 
safely assume that it does not significantly affect the results of this study. In this case, 
Tobin’s q delivers the highest VIF and thus is dropped from the control variables in that 
particular regression.  
 
This data set provides significantly different correlations than earlier literature suggests. 
Especially interesting are the positive and highly significant correlations with the 
industry-adjusted data between leverage and 3-year capital expenditures and 
employment growth since the correlations between leverage and growth measures have 
consistently found to be negative and significant in earlier research. This provides 
motivation to conduct further investigation with multivariate regressions to find if the 
effect of leverage on firm growth has diminished or changed during the time between 
this and earlier studies.  
 
 
3.5 Methods 
 
The regressions in this research paper concentrate on investigating the relationship 
between leverage and firm growth. To test the effect of high or low Tobin’s q on the 
relationship between leverage and firm growth, subgroups based on Tobin’s q are also 
examined. Earlier literature suggests that leverage may not affect the growth of firms 
with high Tobin’s q as much as firms with low Tobin’s q. This smaller effect of 
leverage on firms with many valuable investment opportunities is assumed to be a 
consequence of capital markets reactions when they recognize the investment 
opportunities and thus can rely to that the firm will invest in sensible and value-
increasing investments. In contrast, capital markets may not be able to recognize the 
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investment opportunities of low Tobin’s q firms, and this leads to a lower market 
capitalization. This raises the cost of capital to these firms because investors are not 
certain that the funds will be invested profitably. Because of these assumptions, it is 
interesting to see if there is a significantly different effect of leverage on the growth of 
high and low Tobin’s q firms.  
 
Explanatory variables (including independent, control and dummy variables) are 
regressed against the dependent variables (growth measures) using multiple linear 
regressions for n data points and m independent variables. The regression model 
assumes constant variances and no correlation between the error terms. This is unlikely 
to hold with this data set, as industry effects or other similar effects are likely to 
increase correlation. This can lead to upwardly biased p-values and to avoid these 
problems, using the White adjustment, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
obtained and used to compute more reliable t-statistics for the regression coefficients.  
 
The methods used in this research do not include dummy variables to control for 
industry effect and thus the regressions are also presented with industry-adjusted data. 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) show that “permanent” or average firm leverage ratios 
are strongly related to industry classification and that the relation holds even if regulated 
firms are excluded. They find that cross-sectional regressions on industry dummy 
variables explain 54 percent of variation in firm leverages. After excluding firms that 
face regulations, the industry still explains 25 percent of the variation.  The industry-
adjusted regression is used to study whether firms with higher growth in a specific 
industry have higher or lower leverages than the firms with lower growth. The industry 
adjustment is computed so that all the variables are adjusted by the industry median. 
Industries are specified by US SIC codes. This is done so that if five or more firms 
share the same four-digit SIC code, the industry median for all variables are calculated 
and then subtracted from all the observations. If there are less than five firms sharing 
the same four-digit code, then the number of firms in one industry is computed with the 
same three-digit code. If this does not produce five or more firms for the industry, two-
digit codes are used. Firms that do not share two-digit SIC codes with four or more 
firms are excluded from the industry-adjusted data. 
 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test (also known as Wilcoxon rank-sum or Mann-
Whitney U test) is applied to compare the variable means and medians of the low- and 
high-q subgroups. This will help to interpret the results and give a deeper insight for 
analysis. Before running the MWW test, the outliers of the growth variables are 
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excluded. This is done so that the Z-scores of the variables are obtained, and 
observations with Z-score of over 3,29 or under -3,29 are excluded. This method 
excludes 0,1% of the variables with highest standard deviations and thus gives more 
reasonable average values. 
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4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
The regression results are presented in this chapter. The dependent variables are 
regressed against the independent and control variables. Because firm growth can be 
high due to business cycle and if simultaneously firm leverage is low, a negative 
relationship between firm growth and leverage could be found because leverage proxies 
for business cycle. To avoid this, indicator variables are added in the regressions for 
each year, although their coefficients are not presented in the results.  
 
The regression results are presented in three parts. First, the regressions and analysis are 
presented for the whole time period of 2002–2013. Second, the “normal” years of 2002–
2006 and 2011–2013 combined are analyzed and finally the 2007–2010 “abnormal” 
years including the financial crisis are examined. The regressions are done for raw and 
industry-adjusted data. The regressions are also produced for subgroups defined by 
Tobin’s q. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests are introduced to compare the means and 
medians of the independent and dependent variables between the Tobin’s q subgroups. 
 
 
4.1 Whole time period: 2002–2013 
 
First, the results of the regressions are presented for the whole time period of 2002–
2013 and for both unadjusted and industry-adjusted data. Also the Tobin’s q subgroups 
are examined separately for this period.  
 
Table 5 shows the regression results for unadjusted data in 2002–2013. Leverage seems 
to have a significant negative relationship with all growth measures except 3-year 
capital expenditures growth. However the coefficient for that measure is also negative. 
The other significance levels stay at 1-percent except for 1-year capital expenditures 
growth (5%-level). One approach to assess the relationship is as follows: The 1-year 
capital expenditures growth average is 45,3% and the average book leverage is 21,6%. 
The point estimate for the leverage coefficient implies that if a firm has half the book 
leverage, it would have 1-year capital expenditures growth of 53%, which is a 
difference of approximately 17%. However this is slightly biased as the average annual 
capital expenditures growth in this data set is relatively high. Using the median annual 
capital expenditures growth, the difference would be slightly over 100%.  
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Capital expenditures are associated with subsequent decreases in 3-year capital 
expenditures growth and increases in employment growth. Sales growth that is used to 
capture the multiplier effect does not have any significant coefficients with any of the 
growth measures. Finally cash flow before interest is slightly positively and 
significantly associated with employment growth.  
 
 
Table 5. Regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2002–2013 
The sample period is 2002–2013. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars for each year. All 
data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) growth is the 
percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net investment 
growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets 
(FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets (TA). Sales 
growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of equity and book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest expenses. All 
values are adjusted for inflation. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
      
Unadjusted 
regressions 
2002–2013 
1-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -0.717 -0.458 -0.047 -0.210 -0.096 
 
(2.37)** (1.39) (3.04)*** (3.92)*** (2.61)*** 
Cash Flow / TA -0.957 2.060 0.058 0.167 -0.113 
 
(1.23) (0.72) (2.41)** (1.92)* (0.56) 
CapEx (0) / FA -1.243 -2.926 0.124 0.230 0.789 
 
(1.64) (2.93)*** (3.08)*** (1.82)* (1.57) 
Sales Growth 0.324 -0.022 0.014 0.021 -0.011 
 
(1.08) (0.27) (1.23) (0.79) (0.49) 
Tobin's q 0.062 0.559 0.013 0.059 0.013 
 
(0.93) (1.10) (3.81)*** (5.87)*** (0.78) 
Constant -0.698 0.023 -0.995 -0.955 -0.100 
 
(3.18)*** (0.04) (33.50)*** (22.37)*** (1.22) 
R-squared  0.03 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.02 
# of obs. 3,841 3,071 3,841 3,071 3,841 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
     
 
     The regressions above do not control for industry effects. Table 6 presents the 
regression results with all the variables adjusted for industry. Industries were formed 
using four-, three- and two-digit SIC codes so that every industry group has at least 5 
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firms. Then the median values of variables for each group were subtracted from the 
observations.  
 
 
Table 6. Industry-adjusted regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2002–2013 
The sample period is 2002–2013. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars for each year. All 
data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) growth is the 
percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net investment 
growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets 
(FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets (TA). Sales 
growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of equity and book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest expenses. All 
values are adjusted for inflation. All variables are industry-adjusted. Results are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
      
Industry-adjusted 
regressions 
2002–2013 
1-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -0.763 -0.496 -0.045 -0.174 -0.117 
 
(2.31)** (1.03) (2.73)*** (3.30)*** (2.23)** 
Cash Flow / TA -1.024 2.220 0.055 0.166 -0.079 
 
(1.22) (0.71) (2.26)** (1.86)* (0.39) 
CapEx (0) / FA -1.789 -3.095 0.098 0.208 0.302 
 
(2.98)*** (2.97)*** (2.36)** (1.57) (2.60)*** 
Sales Growth 0.349 -0.013 0.014 0.024 0.008 
 
(1.12) (0.17) (1.24) (0.89) (1.37) 
Tobin's q 0.060 0.590 0.013 0.057 0.022 
 
(0.76) (1.05) (3.44)*** (5.80)*** (1.23) 
Constant 0.238 1.268 0.040 0.089 0.038 
 
(3.53)*** (3.71)*** (1.40) (3.88)*** (3.03)*** 
R-squared  0.04 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.06 
# of obs. 3,336 2,668 3,336 2,668 3,336 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
     
 
The industry-adjusted regressions give corresponding results with the unadjusted ones. 
Again, highly significant and negative relations between book leverage and growth 
measures are observed. In terms of the used growth measures, firms with higher 
leverage than industry median grow less than the industry median. Compared to 
unadjusted regressions, the significance of the coefficient between leverage and net 
investment growth has dropped from 1-percent to 5-percent level, but the strengths of 
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the relations have stayed approximately the same. Capital expenditures now show even 
more explanatory power as it associates negatively also with 1-year capital expenditures 
growth and positively with subsequent net investment growth. Sales growth still 
remains insignificant for all dependent variables and also the coefficients stay at 
moderate levels except for 1-year CapEx growth. 
 
4.1.1 Effect of growth opportunities on the relation of leverage and firm growth  
 
The strong and significant negative relationship between leverage and firm growth gives 
an implication that regardless of firm’s characteristics, leverage weakens the firm’s 
growth. However Lang et al. (1996) find that low-q firms show significant and negative 
relation between leverage and growth making the negative and significant results for 
whole sample largely insignificant. In their study, high-q firms show only one out of 
five significant and negative relations. For other growth measures for high-q firms, the 
results vary from negative to positive with none of them being significant. To test if this 
is the case, the sample is divided in two subgroups based on Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q tries 
to capture the firm’s growth opportunities by assuming that the capital markets 
recognizes those opportunities, and consequently this can be observed from the market 
value of the firm. If the firm’s Tobin’s q is over one, it is assumed to have high growth 
opportunities and vice versa. Table 7 shows the unadjusted regressions for the high- and 
low Tobin’s q subgroups.   
 
When growth opportunities are allowed to affect the relation between growth and 
leverage, some clear differences between the subgroups can be observed. In both cases 
leverage seems to affect negatively and significantly at least some of the growth 
measures, but further investigation reveals that the size of the relations are clearly 
different. For the high-q firms, leverage has a significant relation with all the growth 
measures except for 3-year capital expenditures growth and net investment growth. The 
strongest coefficient is for 1-year CapEx growth being -0,686 with a significance level 
of 5%. For employment growth, a highly significant negative relationship is present, but 
the relations are relatively low (-0,041 and -0,183). All in all, leverage seems to be 
partially associated with firm growth for high-q firms. However, the relations are not 
very strong and the results leave some space for more specific research.  
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The interesting observations are found in the right-hand side of table 7 where the same 
regressions are run for firms with q < 1. The relations between leverage and growth 
measures are highly significant, except for net investment growth. 1- and 3-year CapEx 
growth and 1-year employment growth show negative coefficients with significance 
level of 1%. 3-year employment growth also shows a negative coefficient with 5% 
significance level. When compared to high-q firms, even though both subgroups 
provide negative significant coefficients, the coefficients for low q –firms are much 
stronger. For 1-year CapEx growth, and 1- and 3-year employment growth the 
coefficients are approximately -0,2 stronger. Low-q firms also have a negative 
relationship between leverage and 3-year capital expenditures growth with 1% 
significance level, where high-q firms did not show any significant relation. The 
coefficient is -1,599, which can be considered extremely strong. This implies that for 
firms with low growth opportunities, the effect of leverage on capital expenditures 
growth seems to have a clearly longer-term effect than for high-q firms. 
 
The lower coefficients and less significant results for high-q firms suggest that perhaps 
the negative effect of leverage on growth is relevant for mainly firms with low growth 
opportunities. If capital markets recognize the firm’s growth opportunities, borrowing 
against these opportunities might not be a problem for these firms. However, if the 
growth opportunities are not recognized by outside investors, highly levered firms may 
face difficulties to obtain new outside funds and thus leverage would lead in reduced 
growth. However this conclusion can not be stated as certain, since even though high-q 
firms show smaller relationships between leverage and growth measures, they are still 
negative and significant so the negative effect of leverage on firm growth seems to be 
present even if capital markets recognize the growth opportunities. 
 
Table 8 shows the industry-adjusted regression results for high- and low-q firms. The 
majority of the results seem similar to the unadjusted regression results, but the sizes of 
coefficients between high and low-q firms have leveled closer to each other. After 
industry-adjustment, net investment growth shows significant and negative relation with 
leverage for the first time for the Tobin’s q subgroups. Again, all the coefficients 
between leverage and growth measures are negative.  
 
For high-q firms, approximately the same relations exist as in unadjusted regressions, 
with less significant coefficients in 1- and 3-year employment. Also as mentioned, net 
investment growth now shows significant relation with leverage in industry-adjusted 
regressions.  
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For low-q firms, leverage is negatively and significantly associated with all the growth 
measures. The significance levels have however dropped from 1% to 5% levels in 3-
year CapEx and 1-year employment growth. Also the coefficients are not as strong as in 
unadjusted regressions. Still, compared to high-q firms, the low-q group shows stronger 
negative relations between leverage and growth measures except for the 1-year capital 
expenditures growth. 
 
Table 9 shows the results for Mann-Whiney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test that compares the 
means and medians between the high- and low-q subgroups during the period of 2002–
2013. Results give support for the significantly lower growth and investments for low 
Tobin’s q firms. As mentioned earlier, capital structure theories suggest that firms with 
high growth opportunities should have low leverage. The average debt levels for the 
subgroups are approximately the same, but when comparing the medians, in line with 
capital structure theories, low-q firms have over 20% more debt. For the growth 
measures, low-q firms show lower average and median values for every variable.  
 
 
Table 9. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test between subgroups: 2002–2013 
The mean and median of the growth measures and leverage are compared between the high-q and low-q 
subgroups. The difference has been tested with Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, which is a non-parametric 
test. 
2002–2013 
   
      Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
    Q < 1 Q > 1 Z-value Pr > |Z| 
1-year CapEx growth Mean 12,19% 33,93% -9,0930 0,0000 
 
Median -2,21% 11,58% 
  3-year CapEx growth Mean 58,02% 87,57% -3,6260 0,0000 
 
Median 15,08% 27,00% 
  1-year employment growth Mean -1,00% 7,50% -16,2390 0,0000 
 
Median -0,76% 3,80% 
  3-year employment growth Mean 5,62% 22,60% -11,7190 0,0000 
 
Median 0,48% 11,22% 
  Net investment growth Mean -0,14% 9,30% -14,4870 0,0000 
 
Median -1,90% 2,49% 
  Leverage Mean 21,03% 21,84% -5,9840 0,0000 
  Median 20,46% 16,68%     
 
 
The results show a clear difference between the high- and low-q firms. For high-q firms 
the average net investment growth is 9,3% and the median is 2,49%. For low-q firms, 
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these same figures are -0,14% and -1,9%, respectively. During this time period, low-q 
firms have generally decreased their annual investments when high-q firms have 
increased them. Also the 1-year capital expenditures growth shows similar and even 
more extreme deviation. This gives support for the subgrouping of the sample, since 
high-q firms are assumed to have more valuable investment opportunities than low-q 
firms and thus higher capital expenditures. Also noteworthy is that every mean and 
median of the growth measures are positive for high-q firms, when low-q firms show 
negative values for five out of ten instances.  
 
These regressions were conducted for time period from 2002 to 2013, which includes 
the most severe financial crisis that global financial markets have experienced. The 
economic downturn that started in 2007 has almost certainly decreased the growth 
opportunities of firms and reduced investments. Difficult times have lead firms to 
reduce employment and investments even though valuable investment opportunities are 
present. This abnormal period may have biased the results when examining the whole 
period. However, these results still provide some evidence that the effect of leverage on 
firm growth is negative in general, but no conclusion for the effect of growth 
opportunities on this relation can be drawn here. It is of great interest to examine the 
crisis and normal periods separately, because it is possible that the results for the 
subperiods can differ substantially because of the extreme financial conditions in 2007–
2010. The regressions for the subperiods are presented in the following chapters. 
 
 
4.2 Normal years: 2002–2006 and 2011–2013 
 
To find out if different economical states affect the relation between leverage and 
growth measures, the subperiods for normal and crisis years are studied separately. This 
helps to give deeper insight in the analysis and it offers a possibility to see if the relation 
between leverage and firm growth is different during the crisis than the whole period or 
the so-called normal period. The crisis may have affected the capital structures of firms 
resulting in differing observations than for the whole period. In this chapter, the normal 
years 2002–2006 and 2011–2013 are analyzed. First, the regressions are computed for 
the whole sample, and then for the low-q and high-q subsamples. Regressions are done 
for both raw and industry-adjusted data. Finally the MWW test is applied to compare 
the means and medians of the high- and low-q firms.  
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Table 10 shows the results for the whole sample during normal years. The results are 
quite in line with the regressions for the 2002–2013 period. As before for the whole 
time period, leverage shows significant and negative relations for 1-year CapEx growth 
and 1- and 3-year employment growth. The relation with net investment growth loses its 
significance but is still slightly negative. The 1-year capital expenditures growth now 
has a higher significance at 1% level suggesting that leverage has a negative short-term 
effect on firm’s investments even in normal economical times. The coefficient is not as 
large as before (-0,717 vs. -0,445), but it is still considerably strong to have a significant 
effect on capital expenditures. 
 
 
Table 10. Regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2002–2006, 2011–2013 
The sample period is 2002–2006 and 2011–2013. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars 
for each year. All data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) 
growth is the percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net 
investment growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of 
fixed assets (FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets 
(TA). Sales growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of 
equity and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest 
expenses. All values are adjusted for inflation. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
Unadjusted regressions 
2002–2006, 2011–2013 
1-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -0.445 -0.497 -0.049 -0.236 -0.030 
 
(3.28)*** (1.55) (2.40)** (2.70)*** (0.35) 
Cash Flow / TA -0.385 -0.114 0.008 0.216 -0.028 
 
(1.39) (0.43) (0.18) (2.87)*** (0.20) 
CapEx (0) / FA -0.499 -1.907 0.126 0.139 1.050 
 
(0.59) (3.17)*** (2.26)** (1.25) (1.33) 
Sales Growth 0.138 0.167 0.027 0.125 -0.021 
 
(2.43)** (1.11) (1.04) (1.41) (0.44) 
Tobin's q 0.056 0.018 0.010 0.038 -0.010 
 
(1.65)* (0.53) (2.58)*** (3.73)*** (0.37) 
Constant -0.762 -0.587 -1.000 -1.170 -0.129 
 
(5.79)*** (2.46)** (25.75)*** (11.62)*** (1.17) 
R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.02 
# of obs. 2,305 1,535 2,305 1,535 2,305 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
     
  62 
Cash flow still positively and significantly predicts 3-year employment growth but not 
1-year employment growth as before. Capital expenditures still has same negative 
predictive power for 3-year capital expenditures growth and positive relation with 1-
year employment growth. For 3-year employment growth the significance does not exist 
anymore. Sales growth, which is used in the regressions to allow for multiplier effect 
shows a significant coefficient for the first time. Sales growth positively predicts 1-year 
capital expenditures growth with 5% significance.  
 
The sizes of the coefficients have remained approximately the same, except for the 1-
year CapEx growth where leverage now has about 0,3 lesser effect. The similarity of the 
results compared to the whole period might imply that the abnormal period may not be 
significantly affecting the results for the whole period. However, the abnormal period 
itself can show very differing results.  
 
Table 10 does not take industry effects in to account, hence the regressions are 
computed also with industry-adjusted data. Table 11 presents the industry-adjusted 
regression results for time periods 2002–2006 and 2011–2013. Again, leverage seems to 
affect the growth measures but the industry-adjustment has produced slight changes to 
the results. 1-year CapEx and employment growth retain their significant negative 
relations with book leverage. 3-year employment growth does not produce significant 
results anymore. The negative coefficient between leverage and 1-year CapEx growth 
has strengthened to -0,543 and the effect on 1-year employment growth has remained at 
the same level. Interestingly net investment growth is now clearly negative and 
significantly related to leverage.  
 
Note that all the significant relations between leverage and growth measures are present 
for short-term measures only. The results could be interpreted so that when industry 
effects are taken into account, leverage has a short-term negative effect on firm growth, 
but not for long-term. In normal economic periods firms seem to be able to retain their 
growth after obtaining debt relatively quickly. 
 
Other significant results from table 11 are that cash flow before interest still has a 
positive and significant effect on long-term employment growth, capital expenditures 
per fixed assets affect negatively future capital expenditures and sales growth is highly 
significantly and positively related to short-term capital expenditures growth.  
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Table 11. Industry-adjusted regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2002–2006, 
2011–2013 
The sample period is 2002–2006 and 2011–2013. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars 
for each year. All data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) 
growth is the percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net 
investment growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of 
fixed assets (FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets 
(TA). Sales growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of 
equity and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest 
expenses. All values are adjusted for inflation. All variables are industry-adjusted. Results are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
Industry-adjusted 
regressions 
2002–2006, 2011–2013 
1-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -0.543 -0.399 -0.047 -0.180 -0.099 
 
(2.99)*** (1.25) (2.20)** (1.63) (3.48)*** 
Cash Flow / TA -0.352 -0.187 0.015 0.214 0.026 
 
(1.41) (0.62) (0.35) (2.84)*** (0.31) 
CapEx (0) / FA -1.432 -1.854 0.103 0.102 0.271 
 
(3.34)*** (3.06)*** (1.82)* (0.99) (2.24)** 
Sales Growth 0.186 0.190 0.027 0.162 0.018 
 
(3.11)*** (1.07) (1.02) (1.82)* (1.22) 
Tobin's q 0.082 -0.009 0.011 0.039 0.016 
 
(2.32)** (0.24) (2.48)** (3.19)*** (1.98)** 
Constant 0.209 -0.119 0.036 -0.069 0.042 
 
(3.27)*** (1.22) (1.27) (3.45)*** (3.40)*** 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.03 
# of obs. 2,000 1,332 2,000 1,332 2,000 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
     
 
4.2.1 Effect of growth opportunities on the relation of leverage and firm growth  
 
When regressed for the whole time period, firm’s growth opportunities affected 
particularly the magnitude of the relations between leverage and growth measures. To 
see if such differences still exist in normal economic times, the subgroup regressions are 
computed again for years 2002–2006 and 2011–2013. Table 12 presents the results for 
unadjusted data. The regressions for the high-q subgroup differ slightly from the other 
regressions in this study. Tobin’s q has been dropped from the control variables because 
this dataset provided extremely high multicollinearity between Tobin’s q and cash flow 
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before interest. Since Tobin’s q provided higher variance inflation factors than cash 
flow before interest, it has been dropped from the regression. 
 
Table 12 shows evidence for the importance of low-q firms in the earlier negative and 
significant relations between leverage and growth measures. High-q firms show 
significant results for only 1-year capital expenditures growth, 3-year employment 
growth and net investment growth. However, 1-year CapEx growth and net investment 
growth have significance level of only 10% and also the sizes of the coefficients are 
relatively small. 3-year employment growth shows high significance and also the size of 
coefficient is considerable, which implies that even for firms with high growth 
opportunities, leverage is negatively associated with the number of employees in the 
long run even in normal economical times.  
 
Low-q firms show much stronger coefficients and also higher significance levels. The 
1-year CapEx growth is almost 8 times stronger than for high-q firms and the result is 
also significant at 1-percent level. The 3-year capital expenditures growth has an 
extremely negative coefficient of -2,410 with a significance of 10%. The 1- and 3-year 
employment growths also show rather strong negative coefficients with a high 1% 
significance level. Surprisingly, net investment growth does not show any significance 
for the low-q group.  
 
The different results between the subgroups gives evidence that low-q firms have a 
significantly stronger negative relation between book leverage and the growth measures. 
Even though the high-q firms also have some negative and significant relations, the 
relations are much stronger for the low-q firms. Especially the long-term capital 
expenditures growth for low-q firms shows very powerful negative relation with 
leverage offering more evidence for that the firms with low growth opportunities suffer 
from long-term negative effects of leverage similarly as in the results for whole period. 
 
For high-q firms, cash flow before interest has a highly significant negative relation 
with 3-year employment growth. Cash flow before interest also slightly affects the 3-
year capital expenditures growth for these firms. Sales growth affects positively and 
significantly the 1-year capital expenditures growth for high-q firms. Unlike high-q 
firms, the low-q subgroup shows highly significant and negative relation between base 
year capital expenditures and 1- and 3-year capital expenditures growth. This might be 
because low-q firms do not have much investment opportunities and once they make a 
big investment, they focus on that and reduce their investments in the near future. 
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To control for industry-specific effects the regressions for normal years are conducted 
also with industry-adjusted data. The results are presented in table 13. The results tell a 
similar story as in unadjusted regressions. High-q firms show significant negative 
results for 1-year CapEx and employment growth and net investment growth. However, 
the sizes of the coefficients for 1-year employment growth and net investment growth 
are near zero (-0,038 and -0,075) and thus they do not give much indication in one way 
or another. The 1-year capital expenditures growth gives a relatively strong coefficient 
of minus 0,429 implying that leverage really has a negative effect on short-term capital 
expenditures growth even for high-q firms. In contrast to the unadjusted regressions, the 
base year capital expenditures now show highly significant and negative relations with 
1- and 3-year CapEx growth. This is also interesting and shows that also the high-q 
firms seem to reduce their investments after years of high capital expenditures.  
 
As expected, the low-q firms show much stronger negative relations between leverage 
and growth measures. All of the coefficients except 3-year CapEx growth now show 
significant negative relations. This lack of significance slightly diminishes the 
interpretation that low-q firms have a long-term negative effect of leverage on growth. 
The most interesting thing is that the coefficients are still clearly stronger for low-q 
firms than for high-q firms. For example 1-year employment growth shows 10 times 
more negative relation with leverage for low-q firms. 1-year CapEx growth coefficient 
is also almost twice as large than for high-q firms. For the other explanatory variables, 
the base year capital expenditures show very negative and significant relations with 
future capital expenditures growth measures. Again, these coefficients are well stronger 
for the low-q subgroup. 
 
To conclude, it seems that in normal economic times, leverage has a negative relation 
with firm growth, but the relations are much stronger for firms with low growth 
opportunities. This is slightly differing from Lang et al. (1996) paper, where they were 
not able to find almost any significant and negative relations between leverage and 
growth measures for the high-q firms. In this data set, even though the relations are not 
very strong, there still exist negative and significant relations for the high-q firms also. 
The results give evidence that the effect of leverage on firm growth has changed since 
the 1970–1989 data set used in the Lang et al. (1996) study. Leverage now has some 
effect on firm growth regardless of their growth opportunities. However, low growth 
opportunity firms suffer clearly more from leverage in terms of firm growth. Also, it 
can be said with caution that low-q firms experience longer-term negative effects of
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leverage on firm growth compared to the high-q firms. During normal times, the first 
hypothesis is supported and the second hypothesis gets weak support as leverage 
negatively affects growth for all firms, but there are more significant negative relations 
for the low-q firms and these relations are also stronger. 
 
Table 14 presents the results for Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for the normal periods of 
2002–2006 and 2011–2013. As for the whole time period, the low-q firms again show 
clearly lower average and median growth for all the growth measures.  
 
 
Table 14. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test between subgroups: 2002–2006, 2011–2013 
The mean and median of the growth measures and leverage are compared between the high-q and low-q 
subgroups. The difference has been tested with Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, which is a non-parametric 
test. 
 
2002–2006, 2011–2013 
   
      Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
    Q < 1 Q > 1 Z-value Pr > |Z| 
1-year CapEx growth Mean 13,16% 27,51% -5,060 0,000 
 
Median 0,96% 10,24% 
  3-year CapEx growth Mean 51,23% 62,05% -1,717 0,086 
 
Median 20,97% 28,75% 
  1-year employment growth Mean 0,25% 6,21% -10,848 0,000 
 
Median 0,00% 3,89% 
  3-year employment growth Mean 4,50% 20,27% -8,621 0,000 
 
Median 0,00% 12,07% 
  Net investment growth Mean 1,07% 10,33% -10,193 0,000 
 
Median -1,30% 2,57% 
  Leverage Mean 21,20% 22,25% -4,710 0,000 
  Median 20,78% 16,75%     
 
 
During the normal economic times, in contrast to the whole period analysis, the low-q 
firms now show positive average and median values in all but one cases. It appears that 
during these times, firms have been able to grow in general despite their growth 
opportunities. This could be expected, since during normal economic times, firms aim 
and are generally able to grow their operations. The leverage levels for both groups 
have stayed approximately at the same level as during the whole period. These results 
leave interesting expectations for the MWW test in the crisis period. 
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4.3 Abnormal years: 2007–2010 
 
The final examination focuses on the subprime financial crisis period that occurred 
approximately in 2007–2010. This part gives new evidence of the effect of leverage on 
growth, since the crisis period has not yet been studied very deeply. The financial crisis 
was extremely hard for almost all the companies in developed countries and thus it is 
interesting to see if leverage has had a different effect on firm growth during this period. 
Again, the same regressions are conducted for the whole data sample, and separately for 
the high- and low-q subsamples. Also the regressions are done with unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted data. Table 15 shows the results for the unadjusted regressions with 
the whole data sample for years 2007–2010. 
 
 
Table 15. Regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2007–2010 
The sample period is 2007–2010. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars for each year. All 
data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) growth is the 
percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net investment 
growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets 
(FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets (TA). Sales 
growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of equity and book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest expenses. All 
values are adjusted for inflation. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
Unadjusted 
regressions,  
2007–2010 
1-year 
capital 
expenditure
s growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditures 
growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -1.547 1.101 -0.014 -0.104 -0.002 
 
(1.23) (0.73) (0.49) (2.49)** (0.03) 
Cash Flow / TA -1.955 5.025 0.133 0.204 -0.131 
 
(0.97) (0.88) (3.52)*** (4.32)*** (0.37) 
CapEx (0) / FA -2.628 -3.716 0.125 0.250 0.346 
 
(1.76)* (2.78)*** (2.32)** (1.79)* (3.17)*** 
Sales Growth 0.512 -0.010 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.82) (0.12) (0.72) (0.01) (0.22) 
Tobin's q 0.013 0.854 0.018 0.057 0.021 
 
(0.09) (1.09) (3.48)*** (6.03)*** (0.69) 
Constant -0.119 -0.956 -0.990 -0.955 -0.035 
 
(0.20) (0.60) (67.73)*** (27.07)*** (0.41) 
R-squared  0.05 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.15 
# of obs. 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Immediately, a clear difference to earlier results can be noticed. Only one of the growth 
measures now show significant coefficient in relation to leverage. This growth measure 
is 3-year employment growth, with a size of -0,104 and a significance level of 5%. This 
is very interesting, because during the financial crisis, the regressions would have been 
expected to show negative significant coefficients because of the lack of growth 
opportunities and financial distress in general. However, only the 3-year employment 
growth shows a negative significant coefficient and 3-year capital expenditures growth 
even shows a clearly positive coefficient, though insignificant.  
 
The base year capital expenditures is now significantly related to all of the growth 
measures. For the 1- and 3- year CapEx growth, the relations are highly negative, for 
the 1- and 3-year employment growth they are positive and also net investment growth 
shows a positive and significant coefficient. Finally, cash flow before interest is 
positively and significantly related to 1- and 3-year employment growth with a 1% 
significance level. The results for the unadjusted regressions in crisis period are 
interesting, because they are clearly different than in the other periods examined. Some 
indications can be interpreted here that the financial crisis period has been different in 
terms of the effect of leverage on firm growth. To see if industry effects alter the results, 
the same regressions are done with industry-adjusted data, and the results are presented 
in table 16. 
 
The results with industry-adjusted data stay approximately the same as in unadjusted 
regressions. Again, only 3-year employment growth shows significant coefficient of -
0,116 and other relations between leverage and growth measures are insignificant. Cash 
flow before interest still has positive and significant relations to employment growth. 
Base year capital expenditures loses significance in the relations with employment 
growth, but still show large negative and significant coefficients with 1- and 3-year 
CapEx growth. With net investment growth, CapEx in year 0 shows a positive and 
highly significant relation. 
 
For the whole sample, leverage seems not to be related to firm growth except for long-
term employment growth in the abnormal years. This is a clearly different result 
compared to the whole time period and normal years where leverage showed much 
more negative effect against the growth measures. The abnormal years are obviously 
different in terms of the effect of leverage on firm growth. Next the regressions are 
conducted for the Tobin’s q subgroups to see if the growth opportunities have affected 
the effect of leverage on firm growth during the financial crisis. 
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Table 16. Industry-adjusted regressions of growth measures on leverage: 2007–2010 
The sample period is 2007–2010. Included firms have $1 billion of sales in 2002 dollars for each year. All 
data are obtained from ThomsonReuters database. Capital expenditures (employment) growth is the 
percent change in capital expenditures (employment) for years +1 to 0 and +3 to 0. Net investment 
growth is capital expenditures minus depreciation for year +1 divided by the book value of fixed assets 
(FA) for year 0. Leverage is book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets (TA). Sales 
growth is sales for year +1 divided by sales for year 0. Tobin’s q is total market value of equity and book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Cash flow is gross of interest expenses. All 
values are adjusted for inflation. All variables are industry-adjusted. Results are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
Original 2007–2010 
1-year 
capital 
expenditures 
growth 
3-year 
capital 
expenditures 
growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Leverage -1.712 1.431 -0.025 -0.116 -0.032 
 
(1.32) (0.79) (0.87) (3.41)*** (0.44) 
Cash Flow / TA -2.231 5.241 0.107 0.173 -0.161 
 
(1.03) (0.86) (2.67)*** (3.73)*** (0.43) 
CapEx (0) / FA -2.578 -4.028 0.088 0.202 0.383 
 
(1.79)* (3.12)*** (1.49) (1.33) (2.90)*** 
Sales Growth 0.505 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.81) (0.01) (0.97) (0.14) (0.00) 
Tobin's q -0.009 0.870 0.016 0.053 0.019 
 
(0.06) (1.05) (3.01)*** (6.17)*** (0.58) 
Constant 0.504 1.127 0.061 0.090 0.040 
 
(4.88)*** (4.66)*** (5.52)*** (4.00)*** (2.89)*** 
R-squared  0.05 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.16 
# of obs. 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
     
 
4.3.1 Effect of growth opportunities on the relation of leverage and firm growth  
 
As the regressions for the whole sample during the crisis did not offer any conclusive 
evidence, it is highly interesting to see if there still exist negative relations between 
leverage and firm growth for the subgroup of firms. To examine this possibility, the 
regressions are again conducted for the high- and low-q subgroups. Also the regressions 
are done for both raw and industry-adjusted data. Table 17 shows the results for 
unadjusted regressions for the subgroups in 2007–2010. Recall from table 15 and 16 
that leverage was significantly related to only 3-year employment growth during 2007–
2010. The same case appears for the high-q subgroup, but when the focus is shifted to  
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the low-q group, some interesting results are present. First, there are significant and 
negative coefficients for both capital expenditures growth measures. The significance 
levels are 5% and 1% and the coefficients are quite strong, the 1-year being -1,046 and 
the 3-year being -1,365. Also net investment growth is negatively predicted by leverage 
with 10% significance level. The financial crisis period seems to have effectively 
increased the negative relation between leverage and capital expenditures of the low-q 
firms.  
 
These results support the findings of Lang et al. (1996), where the high-q group did not 
show much significant relations between leverage and growth measures. The low-q 
group however showed many significant relations between leverage and growth 
measures and thus dominating the significant and negative relations observed for the 
whole group in their study. With this data set, the whole sample did not show 
significant relation for the growth measures except for 3-year employment growth, 
which was probably caused by the high-q group’s negative relation between the said 
variables. The reason for this similarity in results for whole sample and high-q group 
might be that the high-q group has almost twice as many observations, and thus the 
negative relations observed for the low-q group were not strong enough to be present 
for the whole sample. The one significant relation for the high-q group though seems to 
be strong enough to present significant relation for the whole sample as well.  
 
To find if controlling for industry effects could give more insight and clearer results, the 
regressions are done with the industry-adjusted data. The results are presented in table 
18. These results show the clearest evidence for how firm growth is related to book 
leverage for firms with different amount of valuable growth opportunities. The high-q 
group does not show any significant correlations between leverage and growth measures 
whatsoever. Also there is not any logic for the signs of the correlation coefficients. To 
conclude, during financial crisis, leverage does not have any relation to firm growth for 
firms with high growth opportunities.  
 
For the low-q firms, the results are opposite. Leverage has highly significant and strong 
negative relations with four of the five growth measures. Only 3-year employment 
growth is not affected by leverage. During financial crisis, the low-q firms suffer 
severely from the effects of leverage on firm growth and high-q firms do not face the 
growth limiting effects of debt. The results obtained for the industry-adjusted 
regressions during the financial crisis are very convincing. Leverage does not have  
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relations to the growth measures for the whole sample or the high-q sample (except 
once), but for the low-q sample, leverage effectively decreases the firm growth. This 
implies that during hard economical times, leverage has a very strong effect on firm 
growth if the firm does not have valuable growth opportunities recognized in the capital 
markets. To analyze more deeply the difference between high- and low-q groups, the 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test is applied for the abnormal years sample. The MWW test 
results are presented in table 19. 
 
 
Table 19. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test between subgroups: 2007–2010 
The mean and median of the growth measures and leverage are compared between the high-q and low-q 
subgroups. The difference has been tested with Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, which is a non-parametric 
test. 
 
2007–2010 
   
      Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon 
    Q < 1 Q > 1 Z-value Pr > |Z| 
1-year CapEx growth Mean 5,82% 37,12% -7,8570 0,0000 
 
Median -10,61% 13,11% 
  3-year CapEx growth Mean 49,39% 90,84% -2,9090 0,0040 
 
Median 10,52% 22,73% 
  1-year employment growth Mean -3,22% 7,49% -11,7900 0,0000 
 
Median -3,01% 3,43% 
  3-year employment growth Mean 4,63% 22,16% -7,6310 0,0000 
 
Median 1,12% 10,00% 
  Net investment growth Mean -1,85% 7,30% -10,1490 0,0000 
 
Median -3,00% 2,21% 
  Leverage Mean 20,78% 20,91% -3,7990 0,0000 
  Median 20,26% 16,16%     
 
 
The MWW test supports the regression results. The low-q group exhibits clearly lower 
average and median values for the growth measures. For example the median value for 
1-year CapEx growth is -10,61% for the low-q firms, and 13,11% for the high-q firms. 
The difference is substantial and provides evidence for a great difference firm growth 
between the two groups. The same is shown for the 3-year CapEx growth, where low-q 
firms have roughly half smaller figures for average and median. Also net investment 
growth shows similar relation. For low-q firms, the median value is -3% and for high-q 
firms 2,21%. Employment growth shows clearly positive values for high-q firms, but 
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negative values for the low-q in the 1-year case and for the 3-year employment growth, 
low-q group presents five to ten times lower values (though positive) than high-q group.  
 
The results are apparent: during difficult financial times, leverage can have a significant 
negative effect on firm growth, especially in terms of investments and capital 
expenditures, for firms with valuable but unrecognized investment opportunities and for 
firms with poor investment opportunities. In times of financial crisis, the first 
hypothesis gets no support, as the whole sample of firms did not experience negative 
growth caused by leverage. The second hypothesis is strongly supported, since low-q 
firms had a significant negative relation between leverage and firm growth, whereas 
high-q firms did not show any significant relations.  
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5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 
In this chapter, the regression results are summarized and analyzed. The discussion is 
divided in three categories, split in terms of the growth measures. First subchapter 
discusses the 1- and 3-year capital expenditures growth and the effect of leverage on 
them. Second, the effect of leverage on 1- and 3-year employment growth is 
summarized and finally the net investment growths relation to book leverage is 
summarized.  
 
 
5.1 The effect of leverage on future capital expenditures growth 
 
The relations of book leverage to 1- and 3-year capital expenditures growth in different 
time periods and different data sets are summarized in table 20. The results are 
presented with unadjusted and industry-adjusted data.  
 
During the whole time period of 2002–2013, book leverage has a negative relation to 1-
year capital expenditures growth for the whole data sample, and for both high- and low-
q subgroups. With the unadjusted data, the negative relation was strongest for the low-q 
group and with industry-adjusted data, it was strongest for the whole sample group. 
This provides a slight possibility to predict that the second hypothesis, which tested the 
effect of growth opportunities to the relation between leverage and firm growth, might 
get support so that low-q group suffers most of the effect of leverage in terms of capital 
expenditures growth.  
 
When the focus is shifted to the 3-year capital expenditures growth, only one group 
shows significant association with leverage. Low-q group has a strong negative 
coefficient of -1,599 with 1% significance level for the unadjusted regression. After 
industry-adjustment, the low-q firms still remains the only group to show significant 
results with a negative relation of -0,919 between leverage and 3-year capital 
expenditures growth. This coefficient is significant at 10% level. Firms whose growth 
opportunities are not recognized in the capital markets seem to experience stronger and 
longer-term negative effects of book leverage on capital expenditures growth. This may 
be caused by the inability to obtain new external funding because investors are not 
certain if the funds are invested profitably. The long-term effect is present only for the 
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low-q group, which is an interesting observation and could give firms with low growth 
opportunities something to think in terms of capital structure.  
 
Table 20. Summary results of the effect of leverage on capital expenditures growth 
Table shows the relation between book leverage and 1- and 3-year capital expenditures growth. The 
results are provided for the whole sample, and the low- and high-q subsamples. Also unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted results are presented separately. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values 
are in parentheses. 
 
 
Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Book leverage 
1-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
3-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
1-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
3-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
2002–2013 
 
  
 
  
Whole sample -0.717 -0.458 -0.763 -0.496 
  (2.37)** (1.39) (2.31)** (1.03) 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.686 -0.199 -0.739 -0.326 
  (2.11)** (0.54) (2.11)** (0.85) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.919 -1.599 -0.665 -0.919 
  (3.57)*** (2.94)*** (3.18)*** (1.74)* 
2002–2006, 2011–2013     
 
  
Whole sample -0.445 -0.497 -0.543 -0.399 
  (3.28)*** (1.55) (2.99)*** (1.25) 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.115 -0.137 -0.429 -0.140 
  (1.80)* (0.46) (2.51)** (0.53) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.812 -2.410 -0.793 -1.045 
  (3.03)*** (1.91)* (2.21)** (1.34) 
2007–2010     
 
  
Whole sample -1.547 1.101 -1.712 1.431 
  (1.23) (0.73) (1.32) (0.79) 
Tobin’s q > 1 -1.557 2.062 -1.987 1.979 
  (1.04) (1.06) (1.17) (0.89) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -1.046 -1.365 -0.614 -1.857 
  (2.38)** (2.58)*** (2.93)*** (2.92)*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01     
 
 
In the normal economic time period of 2002–2006 and 2011–2013, the results remain 
mainly similar as for the whole period. It is noteworthy, that during the normal period, 
the predictive power of the coefficients is lower than in the whole time period. This may 
be caused by the stronger negative effects during the financial crisis that results in 
strengthened coefficients when observed with the whole time period. The 1-year capital 
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expenditures growth is still significantly and negatively related to book leverage for all 
different data sets. For the whole sample, the 1-year CapEx growth has negative 
coefficients with 1% significance for both unadjusted and industry-adjusted data. For 
the high-q group, particularly in the unadjusted regressions, the relation between 
leverage and 1-year CapEx growth is considerably smaller than during the whole period 
(-0,115 vs. -0,686). Also the significance level for this coefficient is only 10%, which 
might imply an uncertain relation between leverage and 1-year CapEx growth for the 
high-q firms in this period. However, the industry-adjusted coefficient shows a stronger 
negative figure of -0,429 with 5% significance level, so no definite conclusions can be 
drawn here. On the other hand, to support the importance of the growth opportunities, 
low-q firms show more significant and more negative coefficients in both unadjusted 
and industry-adjusted regressions (-0,812 and -0,793, respectively).  
 
For the 3-year capital expenditures growth in normal period, the only significant 
relation is for the low-q group in the unadjusted regressions. The coefficient is 
extremely large and negative -2,410 but the significance level stays at moderate 10% 
level. Compared to the results from the whole sample, this supports the interpretation 
that leverage affects the long-term CapEx growth more for low-q firms.  
 
In the abnormal period of 2007–2010, the effect of leverage is unambiguous. The 
significance of the relation between leverage and capital expenditures growth is absent 
in the whole sample and high-q results. During these abnormal times, book leverage has 
had no significant effect on the capital expenditures for these in general and for firms 
with high growth opportunities. However, the low-q firms show highly significant and 
negative results for the relation. In the unadjusted regressions, the low-q group shows a 
negative relation between leverage and 1-year CapEx growth of -1,046 with 5% 
significance. In the industry-adjusted results, the relation is lower, being only -0,614, 
but the significance is at 1% level. For the 3-year CapEx growth, both unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted regressions present negative coefficients with 1% significance level 
for the low-q subgroup. In unadjusted regressions, the coefficient is -1,365 and in 
industry-adjusted -1,857. 
 
The results give evidence to that leverage negatively affects the future capital 
expenditures growth in normal economic times. The negative relation is present for all 
firms regardless of firm’s growth opportunities. However, firms with low growth 
opportunities experience stronger and longer-term declines in CapEx growth than other 
firms. The results also give strong support for the different effect of leverage on CapEx 
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growth in financially difficult times. In abnormal period, leverage strongly and 
negatively affects the firm’s capital expenditures growth in both short- and long-term if 
the firm has poor growth opportunities or if the firm’s valuable growth opportunities are 
not recognized in the capital markets. These firms can experience significant decrease in 
capital expenditures growth in hard financial times if they have high leverage. Firms 
with high growth opportunities did not experience any relation with leverage during 
these times. This adds new insight for the significance of leverage during financial 
crisis. 
 
 
5.2 The effect of leverage on future employment growth 
 
Next, the relations between book leverage and 1- and 3-year employment growth are 
summarized in table 21. During the whole time period, all of the coefficients for both 
unadjusted and industry-adjusted data are significant and negative. However, the low-q 
subgroup shows much stronger negative relations between leverage and employment 
growth than the high-q group. Also when compared to the whole sample, low-q group 
still shows stronger negative coefficients in both unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
regressions and for both 1- and 3-year employment growth.   
 
In the normal economic time period, low-q group has negative and significant relations 
between leverage and 1- and 3-year employment growth for both unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted settings. During this period, high-q group loses significance in the 
unadjusted regressions for the 1-year employment growth coefficient and in the 
industry-adjusted regressions for the 3-year employment growth coefficient. Again, this 
enhances the support of the hypothesis that low-q firms have a stronger negative 
relation between leverage and firm growth than the high-q firms. Another interesting 
observation is that in the unadjusted results, the 3-year employment growth shows 
negative and highly significant relations with book leverage for all the data groups. 
However, the industry-adjustment has affected the results so that for this long-term 
employment growth, only the low-q firms show significant results, still negative. Thus, 
the long-term negative effect of leverage on employment growth, particularly for low-q 
firms, receives more evidence. 
 
For the abnormal period of 2007–2010, the results are not very much in line with the 
other periods. In unadjusted results, the only significant effects (at 5% level) of leverage 
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are found for only the long-term employment growth for the whole sample and high-q 
group. However, the sizes of the coefficients are relatively small -0,104 and -0,093. 
Interestingly, the low-q group shows a slightly positive and far from significant 
coefficient. In the industry-adjusted results, the low-q firms show a negative and highly 
significant coefficient for the 1-year employment growth, but not for the 3-year figure. 
For the whole sample, a highly significant and negative relation between leverage and 
3-year employment growth is present. The high-q group shows no significant relations.  
 
 
Table 21. Summary results of the effect of leverage on employment growth 
Table shows the relation between book leverage and 1- and 3-year employment growth. The results are 
provided for the whole sample, and the low- and high-q subsamples. Also unadjusted and industry-
adjusted results are presented separately. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Book leverage 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
2002–2013         
Whole sample -0.047 -0.210 -0.045 -0.174 
  (3.04)*** (3.92)*** (2.73)*** (3.30)*** 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.041 -0.183 -0.037 -0.144 
  (2.87)*** (3.22)*** (2.51)** (2.46)** 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.216 -0.308 -0.164 -0.279 
  (2.80)*** (2.28)** (1.94)* (1.99)** 
2002–2006, 2011–2013     
 
  
Whole sample -0.049 -0.236 -0.047 -0.180 
  (2.40)** (2.70)*** (2.20)** (1.63) 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.015 -0.236 -0.038 -0.143 
  (1.45) (2.78)*** (1.79)* (1.32) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.412 -0.787 -0.355 -0.409 
  (2.77)*** (3.89)*** (2.00)** (2.15)** 
2007–2010     
 
  
Whole sample -0.014 -0.104 -0.025 -0.116 
  (0.49) (2.49)** (0.87) (3.41)*** 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.005 -0.093 0.008 -0.062 
  (0.13) (2.20)** (0.21) (1.38) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.020 0.029 -0.113 -0.118 
  (0.41) (0.20) (2.86)*** (0.71) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01     
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Generally, during the whole time period leverage seems to be negatively related to 
employment growth, both short- and long-term. This may be a consequence of 
increasing mechanization and automation in the last couple of decades. Also in normal 
times, leverage shows some negative predictive power to employment growth especially 
for low-q firms. Little evidence is also found for the statement that low-q firms 
experience longer-term negative effects of leverage, since that group is the only one to 
show significant negative relation between 3-year employment growth and leverage in 
the industry-adjusted regressions. During the financial crisis, the effects of leverage on 
employment growth are not very logical and clear as they are for the capital 
expenditures growth. The financial crisis does not seem to have any obvious effect on 
the relation between leverage and employment growth, except the fact that the relation 
between leverage and employment growth is almost non-existent during the abnormal 
period. However, the effect of leverage on employment growth during this period stays 
slightly unclear. 
 
 
5.3 The effect of leverage on future net investment growth 
 
To remind the reader, net investment provides a more accurate picture of investment’s 
actual value as it takes depreciation into account. The variable net investment growth is 
also dependent of the firm’s fixed assets and thus it captures different characteristics of 
firm’s development than capital expenditures growth. The summarized regression 
results of net investment growth on book leverage are presented in table 22. 
 
The net investment growth produces very little significant relations with book leverage 
in the unadjusted regressions. One highly significant relation is found for the whole 
sample and for the whole time period. This relation is slightly negative -0,096 and 
significant at 1% level. In the normal period, high-q group experiences a minor negative 
relation between leverage and net investment growth, and in the abnormal period, the 
low-q group shows a small negative relation. These coefficients are only significant at 
10% level. 
 
Because of the low amount of relevant results in unadjusted regressions, the focus is put 
on the industry-adjusted results when analyzing the relation between leverage and net 
investment growth. With industry-adjusted data, the results are much more encouraging 
in terms of getting meaningful conclusions. For the whole time period, leverage is 
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negatively and significantly (5%-level) related to net investment growth for all three 
sample groups, with the low-q group producing the strongest negative relation. During 
the normal time period, the whole data sample and high-q group show low negative 
relations with 1-percent significance level. The low-q group shows clearly stronger 
negative relation, but with a significance level of only 10%. The size of the coefficient 
for the low-q group is three to four times larger than for the other sample groups 
implying a stronger negative effect of leverage on net investment growth for firms with 
low growth opportunities. 
 
 
Table 22. Summary results of the effect of leverage on net investment growth 
Table shows the relation between book leverage and net investment growth. The results are provided for 
the whole sample, and the low- and high-q subsamples. Also unadjusted and industry-adjusted results are 
presented separately. Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Unadjusted Industry-adjusted 
Book leverage            Net investment growth 
2002–2013     
Whole sample -0.096 -0.117 
  (2.61)*** (2.23)** 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.065 -0.108 
  (1.44) (1.98)** 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.198 -0.222 
  (1.49) (2.06)** 
2002–2006, 2011–2013     
Whole sample -0.030 -0.099 
  (0.35) (3.48)*** 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.090 -0.075 
  (1.67)* (2.89)*** 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.290 -0.287 
  (1.24) (1.70)* 
2007–2010     
Whole sample -0.002 -0.032 
  (0.03) (0.44) 
Tobin’s q > 1 -0.042 -0.054 
  (0.41) (0.62) 
Tobin’s q < 1 -0.095 -0.119 
  (1.65)* (2.21)** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
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The financial crisis period shows the most interesting results in terms of finding new 
evidence for the effect of leverage on firm growth. During this period, only the low-q 
group shows a significant relation between leverage and net investment growth with a 
coefficient of -0,119. There is a clear switch in the results between the time periods. 
During the financial crisis only firms with low growth opportunities have had leverage 
affecting their net investment growth significantly, when in other periods the effect was 
observed for every sample. This again adds support to the findings that during difficult 
economic times, firms with low growth opportunities suffer more of the negative effect 
of leverage on firm growth and they are forced to decrease their investments if their 
leverage levels are high. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The rapidly changing financial atmosphere provides many challenges to companies, as 
they have to be ready and quick to adapt to new situations. The capital structure in a 
company is one of the biggest financial decisions and if the level of leverage affects the 
firm’s growth and profitability, it must be thought carefully. This research finds 
evidence that leverage has an effect on firm growth, and that effect is negative, 
particularly during difficult financial times.  
 
In this study, leverage is regressed against five growth variables to find if there are any 
significant relations. The regressions are done with raw unadjusted data and also with 
industry-adjusted data to control for industry effects. The time period of 2002–2013 that 
this paper studies, includes one of the biggest financial crisis that global economy has 
experienced. This crisis provides a great opportunity to examine whether the crisis 
period is different than normal periods in terms the effect of leverage on firm growth. 
To illustrate this, in addition to the whole time period, the regressions are also done for 
normal time periods of 2002–2006 and 2011–2013 combined, and for abnormal time 
period of 2007–2010. This technique offers a chance to see if the decisions regarding 
capital structure have some greater importance when a financial crisis occurs.  
 
This paper tries to answer three research questions: 
 
1. Does leverage affect the growth of firms defined by different growth variables? 
2. Does the firm’s growth opportunities affect the relationship between leverage and 
firm growth? 
3. Does leverage have a different effect on firm growth during economical downturns? 
 
To find answers to these questions, two hypotheses are tested for three time periods; the 
whole period, the normal period and the abnormal period. The hypotheses are as 
follows: 
 
H1: Leverage and firm growth has a negative relationship. 
H2: Leverage has a different effect on firm growth depending on the firm’s growth 
opportunities. 
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Table 23. Summary of regression results 
Table summarizes the results of the effect of book leverage on growth measures. The first row shows the 
results with unadjusted data, and the second row shows the results with industry-adjusted data. Relations 
are stated as “Negative” as negative relation with 5% significance level, “Weak negative” as negative 
relation with 10% significance level and “No” as no significance in the relation. Whole period is 2002–
2013, normal years are 2002–2006 and 2011–2013 combined and abnormal years are 2007–2010.  
 
Book leverage 
1-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
3-year capital 
expenditures 
growth 
1-year 
employment 
growth 
3-year 
employment 
growth 
Net 
investment 
growth 
Whole period   
   
  
Overall Negative No Negative Negative Negative 
 
Negative No Negative Negative Negative 
Tobin's q > 1 Negative No Negative Negative No 
 
Negative No Negative Negative Negative 
Tobin's q < 1 Negative Negative Negative Negative No 
  Negative Weak negative Weak negative Negative Negative 
Normal years      
  
Overall Negative No Negative Negative No 
 
Negative No Negative No Negative 
Tobin's q > 1 Weak negative No No Negative Weak negative 
 
Negative No Weak negative No Negative 
Tobin's q < 1 Negative Weak negative Negative Negative No 
 
Negative No Negative Negative Weak negative 
Abnormal years           
Overall No No No Negative No 
 
No No No Negative No 
Tobin's q > 1 No No No Negative No 
 
No No No No No 
Tobin's q < 1 Negative Negative No No Weak negative 
  Negative Negative Negative No Negative 
 
 
The regression results are summarized in table 23. This paper shows that during the 
whole time period, there is a negative relationship between leverage and firm growth in 
general, supporting the first hypothesis. The negative relations hold for all firms 
regardless of their growth opportunities, and they also hold in both unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted regressions. However, firm growth is affected by leverage more 
strongly for firms with low growth opportunities. In all but one case, the low-q group 
experience stronger negative coefficients compared to the whole sample and the high-q 
group. The low-q firms are also the only group that shows negative and significant 
relation between leverage and 3-year capital expenditures growth, suggesting that these 
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firms experience a longer negative reaction on leverage in terms of capital expenditures. 
The stronger and longer-term relations for low-q groups support the second hypothesis, 
but based on these results, the second hypothesis is not  totally supported as the high-q 
group also presents a clear negative relation between leverage and the other growth 
measures.  
 
Similar results are obtained in the normal time period as well. During 2002–2006 and 
2011–2013, there still exist clear negative relations between leverage and the growth 
variables for the whole sample. Also the subgroups show negative and significant 
relations, but compared to the whole time period, the high-q groups shows slightly less 
significant coefficients. However, there seems to be enough significant and negative 
relations for the high-q group to support the first hypothesis. The low-q firms show 
approximately same types of results as for the whole period, and on the basis of these 
results, the first hypothesis seems to have support during the normal time period also, at 
least partially. 
 
For the second hypothesis during the normal period, the results give more support for 
the hypothesis than during the whole period. Even though the high-q group shows 
predictive negative power of leverage on growth measures, the relations are clearly 
stronger and consistent for the low-q group. During the normal time period, the negative 
relations found are stronger for the low-q firms with no exceptions and the high-q group 
shows only three highly significant negative relations out of ten possibilities. This result 
gives more evidence for the second hypothesis as it suggests that the negative effect of 
leverage on growth affects more those firms that have good growth opportunities but 
they are not recognized in the capital markets and firms that do not have good growth 
opportunities but still want to grow. It is noteworthy, that during normal time period, 
the low-q group shows only a weak negative relation between leverage and the 3-year 
capital expenditures growth, indicating that in normal economic times, the low-q firms 
may not experience as long-term negative effects of leverage as during the whole time 
period. The second hypothesis seems to get relatively strong support with this data set 
during the normal time period. This is in line with capital structure theories that suggest 
that firms with high leverage may not be able to take advantage of growth opportunities 
and firms with poor growth opportunities should not use their funds in poor 
investments. 
 
The last time period, the abnormal years of 2007–2010, offers the most interesting 
contribution to this field of study, since not much earlier research has yet been able to 
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document the effect of leverage on firm growth during this time. The results are 
certainly differing compared to the other time periods in this research. During the time 
period of 2007–2010 and using the whole sample, only the long-term employment 
growth show negative and significant relations with leverage. The other coefficients 
between leverage and growth variables are not significant. The same findings are 
present for the unadjusted and industry-adjusted data. During the financial crisis, there 
is no clear relation between leverage and growth for the whole sample resulting the first 
hypothesis to not be supported. 
 
When the subgroups defined by the growth opportunities are compared, the results are 
surprising, but expected based on earlier research. Firms with high growth opportunities 
have only one significant and negative relation between leverage and the growth 
variables. This is for the 3-year employment growth, but it is only present when the 
regressions are done with unadjusted data. All the other coefficients, whether 
unadjusted or industry-adjusted, are insignificant.  For the low-q group, the results are 
entirely different. The low-q group shows significant and negative relations between 
book leverage and the growth variables for all except 3-year employment growth. These 
results provide strong evidence that during financial turmoil, firms with no growth 
opportunities or growth opportunities that are not recognized in the markets, experience 
significant negative effects of leverage in terms of growth. This may be a consequence 
of that the investors are not willing to offer new debt for the low-q firms during 
economically difficult times because of increased risk aversion and because of that 
these firms are not able to show that they have valuable investment opportunities. Thus, 
the investors focus even more on the firms that are known to invest their funds 
profitably.  Based on these findings, during the abnormal period, the first hypothesis 
does not have any support as the whole sample and high-q group shows almost no 
relation between leverage and the growth variables. However, the second hypothesis 
gets strong support in the financial crisis time period. 
 
To conclude, table 24 summarizes the hypotheses testing. During the whole time period, 
the hypothesis one is supported, since all the sample groups show clear negative relation 
between leverage and the growth measures. The second hypothesis is weakly supported, 
because both Tobin’s q subgroups show negative coefficients but the low-q group 
shows clearly stronger and longer-term negative effects of leverage on firm growth. 
However, it is noteworthy that the high-q group also experiences a clear negative 
relation between leverage and growth, but the difference in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients compared to low-q group gives weak support for the second hypothesis. 
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Table 24. Hypotheses test results 
The table shows whether the hypotheses are supported, not supported or weakly supported. The first 
hypothesis is “Leverage and firm growth has a negative relationship” and the second hypothesis is 
“Leverage has a different effect on firm growth depending on the firm’s growth opportunities”. The 
whole period is years 2002–2013, the normal period is years 2002–2006 and 2011–2013, and the 
abnormal period is years 2007–2010. 
 
Time period Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
Whole period Supported Weakly supported 
   
Normal period Supported Weakly supported 
   
Abnormal period Not supported Supported 
 
 
During normal period, the first hypothesis is supported, because all the sample groups 
show enough negative and significant relations between leverage and growth variables. 
For the second hypothesis, the results give weak support. The low-q group shows 
clearly more significant and negative coefficients than the high-q group. However, 
because the high-q group also experiences negative effects of leverage on firm growth, 
the hypotheses cannot be totally supported.  
 
For the abnormal period, the first hypothesis does not receive any support, since the 
high-q group and the whole data sample did not produce almost any significant negative 
relations. The second hypothesis is strongly supported, because the low-q subgroup 
provided strong evidence for a negative relation between leverage and firm growth and 
as stated, the other samples did not. 
 
This research contributes to the earlier findings that leverage affects firm growth. 
Results show that during normal times, leverage decreases future growth for all firms in 
terms of capital expenditures, net investment and partly employment, regardless of their 
growth opportunities. Increased leverage decreases the amount of funds available and 
the firm’s ability to raise additional funds and these financial constraints effectively 
reduce future investments. However, the negative effect of leverage on firm growth is 
clearly stronger for firms with low growth opportunities and it seems that under 
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financial constraints, the high-q firms are still able to obtain new funding to use in their 
investments. 
 
The biggest contribution of this study is the finding that during difficult financial times, 
only firms with low growth opportunities are strongly and negatively affected by 
leverage in terms of growth. The globalized financial markets are a favorable breeding 
ground for financial crisis such as the subprime crisis, and companies need to be 
prepared for extreme situations. In the light of these findings, companies need to valuate 
their growth opportunities and consider their capital structure also from this point of 
view. 
 
The results of this research suggest that further examination concentrating on capital 
structure’s effects on firm performance during financial crisis is needed, as it seems to 
have had a great effect on the relationship between book leverage and firm growth. The 
results also may give companies valuable guidance when making capital structure 
decisions.   
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